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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELAINE S. SORENSEN, : 
: Cert No. 890145 
Plaintiff, Respondent and : 
Cross-Petitioner, : Priority No. 13 
vs. : 
CLIFFORD G. SORENSEN, : 
: Court of Appeals 
Defendant, Appellant and : No. 870102-CA 
Petitioner. : 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an action for divorce. It was tried in the 
district court, and an appeal was taken to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Both parties petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for 
writs of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of 
Appeals. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENT FOR REVIEW 
Issues On Petition 
1. Is the value of the goodwill of a professional 
dental proprietorship a divisible marital asset upon divorce? 
2. Does the district court's valuation of the dental 
practice constitute a clear abuse of its discretion? 
3. Does the district court's award of expenses for 
expert witnesses constitute a clear abuse of its discretion? 
0l3090.mb.relbnefjor 1 
Issues on Cross-Petition 
1. Is the district courtfs award of attorney's fees 
to Mrs. Sorensen supported both by evidence and by a stipulation 
at trial between the parties? 
2. Is Mrs. Sorensen entitled to attorney's fees for 
defending the appeal before the Utah Court of Appeals? 
LAW DETERMINATIVE OF REVIEW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Nature of the Case 
This is an action for divorce and an equitable 
distribution of the marital assets. 
The Course of Proceedings 
Elaine S. Sorensen filed her complaint on March 22, 
1985, in the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County, 
Utah. The complaint was amended on March 12, 1986. The action 
was tried by Judge Rodney S. Page, without a jury, on October 27 
and November 14, 1986. On February 24, 1987, the district court 
entered a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage between the 
parties and dividing the marital assets. 
On March 24, 1987, Clifford G. Sorensen appealed to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, challenging the district court's property 
valuation and distribution, award of attorney's fees to Mrs. 
Sorensen, and the division of expert witness fees. The Court of 
013090.mb.KLbriefjor 2 
Appeals filed its opinion on February 10, 1989. The opinion is 
reported at Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989), 
cert, granted, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989). 
Disposition in the Court Below 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the district 
court's ruling (the property distribution and the division of 
expert witness fees) and reversed in part (the award of 
attorney's fees). Dr. Sorensen then petitioned the Supreme Court 
for a writ of certiorari. Mrs. Sorensen filed a cross-petition. 
Both petitions were granted, and this appeal followed. 
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Dr. Sorensen's brief contains a long statement of 
facts. Mrs. Sorensen flatly disputes many of the statements and 
she believes others unfairly characterize the parties' marital 
history, their accumulation of assets, and the relative 
contributions of the parties. Nevertheless, Mrs. Sorensen will 
forego extended debate because those statements are largely 
irrelevant. The limited issues raised by the appeal permit a 
more brief recitation of the relevant facts. It is sufficient to 
note the following: 
These abbreviations are used throughout: The record on 
appeal, as paginated by the district court clerk, is designated 
"R"; the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered by 
Judge Rodney S. Page on February 24, 1987, are designated 
"Findings" or "Conclusions"; the Decree of Divorce, entered by 
Judge Page on February 24, 1987, is designated "Decree"; the 
transcript of the first day of trial is designated "Tr. Vol. I"; 
the transcript of the second day of trial is designated "Tr. Vol. 
II"; and the parties' trial exhibits are designated "Tr. Ex." 
013090.mb.reLbriefjsor 3 
The parties were married on April 10, 1975 and remained 
husband and wife for nearly 11 years until their divorce in 
February, 1987. They had four children at the time of trial 
(three boys, then 10, 9 and 6; and one girl, then age 3) whose 
custody was awarded to Mrs. Sorensen. (Tr. Vol. I at 105). 
Dr. Sorensen is a successful dentist who at the time of 
trial had practiced in Roy, Utah, for 16 years. From the time of 
their marriage until the summer of 1976, when their first child 
was born, Mrs. Sorensen worked as a nurse and provided financial 
support to the marriage. Over the next seven years she worked 
periodically in nursing positions, and she kept and maintained 
the home of the parties and cared for the four children. After 
the birth of the fourth child in 1983, Mrs. Sorensen was not 
regularly employed outside the home, other than to work with her 
husband in the dental practice. She worked both part-time and 
full-time to keep the office records and to collect receivables, 
and she assisted Dr. Sorensen in planning business strategies. 
(Tr. Vol. I at 105-107). 
Among the many witnesses at trial were three called by 
the parties to value Dr. Sorensen's dental practice. Dr. Richard 
Austin testified for Mrs. Sorensen. Dr. Austin is a dentist who 
had practiced in the Salt Lake City and Park City areas for four 
and one-half years. He had also acted for two and one-half years 
as a broker for the sale and/or purchase of dental practices. He 
was associated with Paul Sletten & Associates, a Denver based 
company which had been actively engaged for over eighteen years 
013<m.mb.relbriefjor 4 
in the appraising, selling and buying of dental practices. 
Before his participation in this case, Dr. Austin had appraised 
twelve dental practices, personally brokered (purchased or sold) 
eight practices within the State of Utah and been involved as a 
consultant on others. He knew of no one in the State of Utah 
with his professional background who brokered dental practices. 
(Tr. Vol. I at 59-65). 
Dr. Austin presented to the court a written valuation 
of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice. (Tr. Ex. D). The Exhibit and 
his valuation of the practice were based upon information 
supplied earlier by Dr. Sorensen in his answers to 
interrogatories and upon Dr. Austin's experience as a dentist and 
broker. (Tr. Vol. I at 68). Dr. Austin noted that, "It is 
important to realize that this evaluation has been made with the 
standards that are currently acceptable for this purpose. 
Existing market trends in the State of Utah for the disposition 
of dental practices were given consideration." (Tr. Ex. D at 2). 
Dr. Austin valued the overall practice by calculating 
the value of three components. (Tr. Vol. I at 66-76). The first 
was "tangible assets," including furniture and equipment, for 
example. He valued those assets at $15,330. (Tr. Vol. I at 68). 
The second component was "accounts receivable." He excluded all 
accounts unpaid for over 120 days, then discounted by 12% the 
total of those accounts then outstanding for no more than 120 
days to allow for uncollectible accounts. In this fashion he 
valued the accounts receivable at $22,170 as of October 21, 1986, 
OU(m.mb.Td.bnefjsor 5 
one week before trial. (Tr. Vol. I at 69). The third component 
was "intangible assets," which included the "goodwill" of Dr. 
Sorensen's practice. Dr. Austin took the receipts and expenses 
of Dr. Sorensenfs practice for three years and then calculated 
the average revenues over the period; that figure was $184,000. 
(Tr. Vol. I at 70). He discounted that figure by 66% to reflect 
an actual sale to a prospective buyer and to reflect his 
assumption that Dr. Sorensen would assist in the transfer of 
ownership but thereafter would no longer be associated with the 
practice. (Tr. Vol. I at 70-76, 83). He calculated $62,560 as 
the total value of the intangibles. When added together, the 
three components constituted Dr. Austin's total valuation of Dr. 
Sorensen's dental practice: $100,060. (Tr. Ex. D). 
Two accountants, Gerald Deters and Roger Nuttall, 
testified for Dr. Sorensen. Mr. Deters calculated the net income 
of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice in 1974 (before the parties' 
marriage) and in 1986 (after separation), and concluded the 
practice in 1974 was "a little bit bigger, a little better" than 
at the time of trial. (Tr. Vol. I at 287-289). Mr. Nuttall 
testified that Dr. Austin's valuation of the dental practice 
should be reduced by $10,129 to reflect existing accounts 
payable. (Tr. Vol. II at 23). He believed the practice was well 
established in 1974, that Dr. Sorensen was then earning a median 
salary, and that neither of those conditions changed appreciably 
during the marriage. (Tr. Vol. II at 27). 
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The district court took the matter under advisement. 
It made a ruling on January 5, 1987. (R. 65-78). The court 
believed the testimony of Dr. Austin. It found the total value 
of the practice to be $100,000. (R. 82; Findings f 14). The 
court discounted this figure by 10% because it also found that 
dental practices usually sell for approximately 90% of their 
appraised value. (R. 82; Findings f 15). Then, because Dr. 
Sorensen had been in practice for 16 years and the parties had 
been married for 11 of those years, the court took ll/16ths (or 
69%) of the $90,000 value, for a net sum of $62,100, representing 
the value of Dr. Sorensen's practice. (R. 87; Conclusions 5 7). 
The district court ordered an essentially equal division of the 
parties1 property. The professional practice went to Dr. 
Sorensen with an equalizing credit to Mrs. Sorensen (R. 97; 
Decree f 26): 
MRS. SORENSEN DR. SORENSEN 
Home 
Car 
Furniture & fixtures 
Piano 
Guitar 
Wolfcreek membership 
Yard equipment 
Camera 
Pension plan interest 
TOTAL 
Less equity interest 
brought in 
$100,000 
750 
6,500 
7,500 
160 
1,000 
555 
600 
20.104 
$136,369 
5.800 
$131,369 
Dental Practice 
*Farm 
Farm equipment 
Truck 
Spa 
*Dental Building 
Piccolo 
Computer 
Motorcycles 
Pension interest 
TOTAL 
Less equity interest 
brought in 
$ 62,100 
30,422 
4,000 
400 
250 
11,457 
2,000 
3,000 
1,500 
31.241 
$146,370 
15.000 
$131,370 
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*Farm $ 78,200 
Contract Bienestar 19,165 
Home Contract 42.000 
TOTAL $139,365 
Less - 108.943 
Balance $30,422 
*Dental Building $ 74,000 
Less contract to 
Thompsons - 42,543 
Less amount to 
defendant's mother - 20.000 
Balance $ 11,457 
The court ordered Dr. Sorensen to pay his own 
attorney's fees and $2,000 towards his wife's fees. It ordered 
the parties to pay the expenses for their own expert witnesses. 
It also ordered them to divide evenly the expenses of one expert, 
Alan Heiskanen. (R. 96; Decree 1 23). 
ARGUMENT ON PETITION 
Summary of Argument 
The district court properly included the value of 
goodwill in the overall valuation of Dr. Sorensen's dental 
practice. The court's valuation of the practice and the 
subsequent allocation of the value between the parties does not 
reveal a clear abuse of discretion. In any event, Dr. Sorensen 
did not object at trial and cannot now raise the issue on appeal 
for the first time. 
The parties agreed at the pretrial conference that the 
district court would decide who should pay the expert witness 
fees of Alan Heiskanen, a real estate appraiser. The court, 
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nevertheless, has discretion in a divorce case to award a needy 
spouse the funds required to prosecute the action. The fees of 
an expert witness, similar to attorneyfs fees, fall within this 
discretion. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY VALUED DR. SORENSEN'S DENTAL 
PRACTICE. 
Dr. Sorensen claims the property division was unfair. 
He contends (his brief at 19-39) the district court improperly 
valued his dental practice by including amounts for "goodwill" 
and accounts receivable, but excluding any amount for accounts 
payable. He asks the Court to vacate the property division. 
The argument is ill-founded. The goodwill of a 
professional proprietorship is a marital asset which is divisible 
upon divorce. The district court considered all of the available 
evidence and, in its discretion, determined an overall value for 
the dental practice. Record evidence supports that 
determination. 
A. "Goodwill" In A Professional Proprietorship Is A 
Divisible Marital Asset. 
Dr. Sorensen contends (his brief at 20-31) that, as a 
matter of law, there is no goodwill in a professional dental 
practice. His argument is disarmingly simple. It is not 
persuasive, however, for at least three reasons. 
1. Dr. Sorensen Waived the Issue by Not 
Objecting at Trial. 
The issue of goodwill valuation was raised on the first 
day of trial. In an opening statement, Dr. Sorensen's lawyer, 
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Robert A. Echard, told the court that the valuation of Dr. 
Sorensen's dental practice would be an issue. (Tr. Vol. I at 4). 
Only hours later, Mrs. Sorensen's lawyer, Tim W. Healy, raised 
the specific issue of "goodwill" during direct examination of 
her expert witness, Dr. Richard Austin. (Tr. Vol. I at 70-72). 
Dr. Sorensen did not object. In fact, he actively litigated the 
issue. Dr. Sorensen called his own expert witnesses, Mr. Deters 
and Mr. Nuttall, who gratuitously offered testimony about 
goodwill, albeit to establish a different value. (Tr. Vol. I at 
321; Tr. Vol. II at 24). Having failed to object at trial, Dr. 
Sorensen may not raise the issue for the first time on appeal. 
Rogers v. M. 0. Bitner Co., 738 P.2d 1029, 1033, 1034-35 (Utah 
1987); Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1986). 
2. The Court of Appeals Followed Utah Law When It 
Held the "Goodwill" of A Professional Practice is 
A Divisible Marital Asset. 
The Court of Appeals held the goodwill of a 
professional practice is a marital asset subject to valuation and 
distribution in appropriate circumstances. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 
769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989), cert, granted, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 
1989). Dr. Sorensen contends the holding conflicts with three 
prior opinions from this Court (Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 
. (Utah 1988); Doau v. Doau, 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982); and Jackson 
v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667 (1966)) and with one 
prior opinion from the Court of Appeals (Stevens v. Stevens, 754 
P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988)). 
0UC90.mb.reLbntfjor 10 
The argument simply is not correct. The Court of 
Appeal's decision is thoroughly researched, well reasoned, 
artfully written, and in harmony with Utah law and with the 
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions which have considered the 
issue. A copy of the Sorensen opinion is included in Appendix A. 
Dr. Sorensen has not accurately described any of the 
four opinions mentioned in his brief. Consider first the Jackson 
opinion. There, defendant claimed the goodwill of his former 
business partnership was an asset and he was entitled to a share 
of its value on dissolution. 415 P.2d at 668-69. In resolving 
the issue, the Supreme Court embraced what it then perceived as 
the prevailing rule:2 a professional partnership does not have 
goodwill to distribute as a firm asset on its dissolution. Id. 
at 670-71. The Court did not consider the rule absolute, 
however. It noted there are decisions which reach a different 
conclusion because of their particular facts and circumstances. 
2
 The original quotation taken by the Supreme Court over 24 
years ago from American Jurisprudence was dropped from the 
current volume of the encyclopedia. Compare 40 Am. Jur. 
Partnership § 271, at 316 (1942), with 59A Am. Jur. 2d 
Partnership § 338, at 413-414 (1987). American Jurisprudence 
Second concedes that what once may have been considered the 
"general rule" is not accepted now in most jurisdictions having 
considered the issue and that the existence of goodwill in a 
professional business is a question of fact, not law. 
The Court would have been better served when deciding 
Jackson if it had relied upon 24 Am. Jur. Good Will § 11, at 808 
(1942). Section 11 correctly states that the goodwill of a 
professional practice is a valuable, yet intangible, asset which 
can be transferred. See also Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 
2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (quoting and applying § 
11). 
0l3090.mb.nLbriefjor 11 
Id. at 670. Accordingly, the Court said the general rule applies 
in a business partnership, 
unless the parties have in their partnership agreements 
provided otherwise, or the facts and circumstances of 
the particular case would require a modification of the 
general rule. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) The Court then reviewed the appeal record 
to determine whether the disgruntled partner had established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that his former partnership had an 
asset of goodwill in which he was entitled to share. Id. at 669. 
The Court examined the parties1 prior business affairs, It found 
the partners had agreed not to carry goodwill as an asset on the 
partnership books; at the time of dissolution they had valued the 
business assets without consideration for goodwill; and, there 
was not an adequate showing the partnership agreement 
contemplated the use of goodwill to compute book value,, Id. at 
671. The Court concluded "the weight of the evidence 
preponderates that under the facts and circumstances of this 
case" there was not goodwill in the old partnership for the 
partner and, for that reason, the finding of the district court 
was correct. Id. at 671. (Emphasis added.) The Court did not 
rule as a matter of law in Jackson. It focused on the record 
evidence, because the existence, valuation, and allocation of 
goodwill are questions of fact. 
Dr. Sorensen's reliance on Dogu is equally misplaced. 
The facts of the case, the issues, even the dicta emphasized by 
013090.mb.Klbnefjor 12 
Dr. Sorensen in his brief (at 22-23) — none of these address the 
issue of establishing goodwill. Doau offers no guidance. 
In Gardner, this Court squarely recognized goodwill as 
a distributable marital asset. There, the spouses wrestled with 
the proper division of their marital assets, including a medical 
clinic where the husband, a general surgeon, was employed. Both 
parties valued the husband's interest in the clinic. The Court 
noted that in the valuation process, neither party gave any 
"consideration to the good will inherent in the professional 
clinic." Id. at 1080. That observation was more fully 
explained in a footnote: 
A marriage may be analogized to a partnership. 
Upon dissolution of the marital "partnership," an 
equitable distribution should be based on consideration 
of all assets, not just those that survive the trip to 
the bottom of the balance sheet. Where appropriate, 
value may be given to that 'something in business which 
gives reasonable expectancy of preference in the race 
of competition,' commonly known as good will. Jackson 
v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81, 85, 415 P.2d 667, 670 
(1966). 
The ability of a business to generate income from 
its continued patronage is commonly referred to as good 
will. Good will is properly subject to equitable 
distribution upon divorce. See, e.g., Duaan v. Duqan, 
92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); Matter of Marriage of 
Fleege, 91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). But see 
The Treatment of Good Will in Divorce Proceedings, 18 
Fam.L.Q. 213 (1984). 
Id. at 1080, n.l. (Emphasis added.) 
The Court of Appeals held goodwill to be a marital 
asset in Stevens. There, the wife contended the district court 
had failed to value and distribute the farming and feed-hauling 
operations pursued by the husband. She claimed the operations 
had an asset of goodwill. The Court of Appeals held her claim 
ii 
failed on two grounds. First, her expert witness had testified 
that his appraisal utilized standard procedures for valuing 
"going concern" businesses. Thus, the wife's expert testimony 
had confused "goodwill" with "going concern value." Id. at 957. 
Second, she failed to meet her burden of proof that the business 
activities enjoyed the type of patronage or reputation found 
within "goodwill." Id. at 956-957. 
The Court of Appeals prefaced its analysis with a brief 
discussion of goodwill: 
The presence of good will may be evidenced by proof of 
an on-going competitive enterprise having continuity of 
place and commercial name and enjoying a favorable 
reputation founded upon prior sales of goods or 
services. 38 Am.Jur.2d Good Will §§ 4-8 (1968). The 
presence or absence of good will depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case. See Jackson, 
18 Utah 2d at 86-87, 415 P.2d at 670-71. Where 
appropriate, the good will value of a business 
enterprise is subject to equitable distribution. 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1080 n.l (Utah 
1988) . 
Id. at 956. Thus, the existence of goodwill is a factual issue, 
varying from case to case, and its value may be distributed when 
appropriate. The Court then noted at least one factual 
circumstance which, if shown by evidence to the satisfaction of 
the district court, could preclude the existence of goodwill: 
There can be no good will in a business that is 
dependent for its existence upon the individual who 
conducts the enterprise and would vanish were the 
individual to die, retire or quit work. Jackson, 18 
Utah 2d at 86, 415 P.2d at 670. 
Id. at 956. In making this comment, the Court noted a factual 
defense to litigants in the position of Dr. Sorensen: Show that 
your professional practice is dependent solely on you for its 
existence and that it would vanish if you departed. Dr. Sorensen 
1 A 
did not even attempt to prove these facts, or, if he did, the 
district court simply was not persuaded. Moreover, Dr. Austin, 
the expert witness, appraised the dental practice as a sale and 
as a consequence, drastically reduced the sale price by 66%. His 
expert testimony assumed Dr. Sorensen would no longer be 
associated with the practice. 
In each of the four opinions cited by Dr. Sorensen, 
Utah appellate courts have recognized goodwill as a marital asset 
which may be valued and distributed upon divorce. The Court of 
Appeals decision in Sorensen is not contrary to Utah law. 
It is important to notice that Jackson (and the 
opinions noted in American Jurisprudence) deals exclusively with 
the existence of goodwill in a professional business and its 
division among associates upon dissolution of the business. The 
existence and apportionment of goodwill incident to a divorce are 
treated differently, however. A recent decision from the Arizona 
Supreme Court highlights the distinction: 
The confusion in this area of the law exists 
partially because many of the cases concerning the 
existence and evaluation of goodwill involve 
partnership dissolution, and not marital dissolution. 
Often the valuation of partnership assets, including 
goodwill, is controlled by the partnership agreement. 
In this case we are dealing with a marital dissolution 
which does not affect the continuation of the business 
partnership. The current situation is aptly described 
as follows: 
A professional practice goes automatically to the 
spouse licensed to practice it. He is not selling out 
or liquidating, but continuing in business. 
Effectively, it is the case of the silent partner 
withdrawing from a going business. And, if such 
partner is to receive fair compensation for her share, 
or her enforced retirement, it should be so evaluated. 
i* 
Brawman v. Brawman. 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 882, 19 Cal. 
Rptr. 106, 109-10 (1962). 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (Ariz. 
1987) . 
It is essential to the proper review of this appeal to 
focus on those opinions which address goodwill in the context of 
a divorce. If that is done, a distinct pattern emerges: all but 
one of the jurisdictions in the Pacific region which have 
addressed the issue, hold goodwill in a professional business is 
a marital asset divisible upon divorce.3 It is the favored rule 
3
 See, e.g.: 
ARIZONA; 
Mitchell v. Mitchell. 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208 (1987) 
Carriker v. Carriker, 151 Ariz. 296, 727 P.2d 349 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1986) 
Wisner v. Wisner. 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1981) 
CALIFORNIA; 
In Re Marriage of Fonstein, 17 Cal. 3d 738, 131 Cal. Rptr. 
873, 552 P.2d 1169 (1976) 
In Re Marriage of Watts. 171 Cal. App. 3d 366, 217 
Cal. Rptr. 301 (Cal. App. Ct. 1985) 
In Re Marriage of Fenton. 134 Cal. App. 3d 451, 184 
Cal. Rptr. 597 (Cal App. Ct. 1982) 
In Re Marriage of Slater. 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 160 
Cal. Rptr. 686 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979) 
In Re Marriage of Webb. 94 Cal. App. 3d 335, 156 
Cal. Rptr. 334 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979) 
In Re Marriage of Aufmuth. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 
Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. App. Ct. 1979) 
In Re Marriage of Foster. 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 
Cal. Rptr. 49 (Cal. App. Ct. 1974) 
In Re Marriage of Lopez. 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 
Cal. Rptr. 58 (Cal. App. Ct. 1974) 
In Re Marriage of Fortier. 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 109 
Cal. Rptr. 915 (Cal. App. Ct. 1974) 
Todd v. Todd. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1969) 
Golden v. Golden. 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 75 Cal. Rptr. 
735 (Cal. App. Ct. 1969) 
Fritschi v. Teed. 213 Cal. App. 2d 718, 29 Cal. Rptr. 114 
(continued...) 
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(Cal. App. Ct. 1963) 
Brawman v. Brawman. 199 Cal. App. 2d 876, 19 Cal. Rptr. 106 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1962) 
Mueller v. Mueller. 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 301 P.2d 90 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1956) 
Franklin v. Franklin. 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 155 P.2d 637 
(Cal. App. Ct. 1945) 
COLORADO; 
In Re Marriage of Nichols. 606 P.2d 1314 (Colo. Ct. App. 
(1979) 
MONTANA; 
In Re Marriage of Hull. 712 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1986) 
NEW MEXICO; 
Hertz v. Hertz. 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169 (1983) 
Hurlev v. Hurley. 94 N.M. 651, 615 P.2d 256 (1980) 
OREGON; 
In Re Marriage of Goger. 27 Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1976) 
In Re Marriage of Steinbrenner. 60 Or. App. 106, 652 P.2d 
845 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) 
WASHINGTON; 
In Re Marriage of Hall. 103 Wash. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 
(1984) 
Matter of Marriage of Fleege. 91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 
1136 (1979) 
In Re Marriage of Freedman. 23 Wash. App. 27, 592 P.2d 1124 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979) 
In Re Marriage of Kaplan. 23 Wash. App. 503, 597 P.2d 439 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979) 
In Re Marriage of Lukens. 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P.2d 279 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1976) 
The issue was presented to the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Saviers v. Saviers. 92 Idaho 117, 438 P.2d 268 (1968). There the 
wife appealed, alleging error by the trial court for its failure 
to find and value her husband's interest in the good will of his 
medical partnership. The Supreme Court found no error since the 
trial transcript did not contain any evidence from which value 
could be determined. 
The Court of Appeals of Idaho has held the goodwill of a 
family owned business (truck stop) is marital property which 
should be valued and distributed upon divorce. The court 
declined to resolve the issue in the context of a professional 
practice. Carr v. Carr. 108 Idaho 684, 701 P.2d 304, n. 4 at 309 
(Idaho App. 1985). 
(continued...) 
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elsewhere, too. 
3(...continued) 
CONTRA; 
KANSAS; 
Powell v. Powell. 231 Kan. 456, 648 P.2d 218 (1982). 
4
 See, e.g.; 
ILLINOIS; 
In Re Marriage of White. 98 111. App. 3d 380, 53 111. Dec. 
786, 424 N.E.2d 421 (111. App. Ct. 1981) 
KENTUCKY; 
Heller v. Heller. 672 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) 
NEBRASKA; 
Lockwood v. Lockwood. 205 Neb. 818, 290 N.W. 2d 636 (1980) 
NEW JERSEY; 
Dugan v. Dugan. 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1982) 
Stern v. Stern. 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975) 
Lew v. Lew. 264 N.J. Super. 542, 397 A.2d 374 (N.J. 
SUper. Ct. App. Div. 1978) 
NORTH CAROLINA; 
Dorton v. Dorton. 77 N.C. App. 667, 336 S.E.2d 415 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1985) 
Poore v. Poore. 75 N.C. App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266, disc. rev. 
denied, 314 N.C. 543, 335 S.E.2d 316 (1985). 
Weaver v. Weaver. 72 N.C. App. 409, 324 S.E.2d 915 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1985) 
NORTH DAKOTA; 
Nastrom v. Nastrom. 262 N.W.2d 487 (N.D. 1978) 
See generally; 
The Valuation of a Professional Practice in Equitable 
Distribution. 22 Wake Forest L. Rev. 327 (1987) 
Professional Corporation May Have Valuable Goodwill. Apart 
from Person of Individual Member. That Must be 
Considered in Property Settlement on Divorce. 11 St. 
Mary's L. J. 222 (1979) 
Comment. Professional Goodwill as Community Property; How 
Should Idaho Rule? 14 Idaho L. Rev. 473 (1978) 
(continued...) 
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There is no reason to treat the issue differently in 
this instance. Often the major asset of many marriages is the 
professional practice managed by one spouse. The goodwill of that 
practice can be valued by generally accepted accounting methods5 
and its value can be allocated between the parties. Dr. Sorensen 
will continue to benefit from the goodwill established in his 
dental practice. Failure to value that goodwill and compensate 
Mrs. Sorensen accordingly, would not comport with an equitable 
distribution scheme. 
B. The Court of Appeals Considered All Appropriate 
Evidence of Value. 
Dr. Sorensen contends no evidence was offered at trial 
to establish the value of the dental practice as of the date of 
marriage and what evidence of value there was, indicated the 
dental practice was a premarital asset of Dr. Sorensen1s. The 
4(...continued) 
CONTRA: 
MISSOURI: 
Carter v. Carter, 616 S.W.2d 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) 
TEXAS: 
Nail v. Nail. 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972). The decision was 
discussed and criticized in The Exclusion of 
Professional Good Will From Partition on Divorce. 10 
Hous. L. Rev. 966 (1973). 
WISCONSIN; 
Holbrook v. Holbrook. 103 Wis. 2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1981) 
See, e.g.. American Dental Association, Valuation of a 
Dental Practice: A Brief Overview for Buyers and Sellers 
(undated). 
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issue is not properly before this Court. It was never raised in 
Dr. Sorensenfs initial brief, in his reply brief or at oral 
argument. It was not addressed by the Court of Appeals. It 
cannot be raised now for the first time. 
C. The District Court's Valuation of Dr. Sorensen's 
Dental Practice Does not Constitute a Clear Abuse 
of Its Discretion. 
Dr. Sorensen also attacks the district court's 
calculation of the overall value of his dental practice. He 
contends the court improperly included the accounts receivable, 
but having done so, omitted any consideration of the accounts 
payable. In short, he asks the Court to substitute its judgment 
for the district court's. 
In determining whether the district court erred in 
valuing the practice, the evidence must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to support the decision. The court's actions are 
entitled to a presumption of validity. Hansen v. Hansen. 73 6 
P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987); Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d 
781, 782 (Utah 1986). In particular, 
[b]ecause parties often place widely disparate values 
on assets to be distributed in a divorce proceeding, 
determination of the assets' value is a matter for the 
trial court, which will not be reversed in the absence 
of a clear abuse of discretion. 
Cook v. Cook. 739 P.2d 90, 93 (Utah App. 1987). 
1. Consideration of Accounts Receivable in the 
Valuation of Goodwill Is not contrary to Utah 
Law. 
The district court included the value of accounts 
receivable in the overall valuation of Dr. Sorensen's dental 
practice. He argued to the Court of Appeals that the accounts 
receivable represented deferred income from which he could pay 
his child support and short-term alimony obligation. Since they 
were income, he contended, it was error to include them as an 
asset of the dental practice. He relied exclusively on a 
quotation from Dogu for support of his argument: "The 
corporation's accounts receivable represent deferred income from 
which respondent may meet his ongoing alimony and child support 
obligations to appellant." Id. at 1309. 
The Court of Appeals disagreed. It was not persuaded 
that the statement from Dogu stands for the proposition that 
accounts receivable may never be considered in the valuation of a 
professional corporation. Even a cursory glance at Dogu reveals 
it says nothing of the kind. The Supreme Court did not preclude 
consideration of receivables. Rather, the Court was only 
summarizing the district court's plan for distribution of the 
value of the husband's professional corporation to demonstrate 
that the district court had not abused its discretion. The Court 
of Appeals also observed that Dr. Sorensen had not cited any 
other authority for his argument and then it noted that other 
jurisdictions regularly include accounts receivable in the 
property distribution and find error when it is not. 
2. The Division of Marital Assets Was Ecruitable 
and Need Not Be Precisely Equal. 
Dr. Sorensen contends Dr. Austin's valuation of the 
dental practice failed to consider $10,129 in accounts payable. 
The Court of Appeals held the record was unclear on the issue, 
but that even if the full amount of the accounts payable had not 
been considered, it was harmless error because the distribution 
?i 
of marital assets need not be precisely equal, only equitable* 
Dr. Sorensen contends the ruling of the Court of Appeals was 
arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of its authority. His 
argument is not correct. 
The district court attempted to divide the marital 
property evenly, giving each spouse approximately $131,000 in 
assets. If it is true the accounts payable were not considered 
— in effect, awarding slightly less to Dr. Sorensen — the 
distribution is not error. 
The Court of Appeals correctly noted that a division of 
marital assets need not be mathematically precise and equal. 
Corning v. Corning, 744 P.2d 325, 329 (Utah App. 1987) ("While 
equality is a worthy goal, precise mathematical eq[uality is not 
essential or required," citing Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 
(Utah 1985) and Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982)). 
Rather, the task of the district court is to provide an equitable 
adjustment of the parties1 financial resources: 
There is no fixed formula upon which to determine a 
division of properties, [sic] it is a prerogative of 
the court to make whatever disposition of property as 
it deems fair, equitable and necessary for the 
protection and welfare of the parties. In the division 
of marital property, the trial judge has wide 
discretion, and his findings will not be disturbed 
unless the record indicates an abuse thereof. 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980). True to 
these guidelines, and in consideration of the total property 
distribution between the parties, the Court of Appeals held the 
district court had accomplished an equitable distribution which 
would not be disturbed on appeal. To do otherwise, as Dr. 
Sorensen suggests, would obligate Utah appellate courts to render 
oo 
an accounting for every property distribution, approving only 
those whose awards balance precisely and setting aside all 
others. 
One final note. Dr. Sorensen rests his contention on 
the absence of any reference to "accounts payable" in the 
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or in the decree. 
Remember, the district court accepted Dr. Austin's valuation of 
the dental practice. He testified that one of three components 
making up his valuation was a sum for "intangible assets." (Tr. 
Vol. I at 70-72). To calculate that sum, Dr. Austin combined the 
receipts and expenses of Dr. Sorensenfs practice to produce an 
average of the profits earned by Dr. Sorensen over a three year 
period. (Tr. Vol. I at 70). Dr. Austin testified that he 
reviewed the accounts payable as part of his review of expenses. 
(Tr. Vol. I at 71). Thus, the figures which Dr. Sorensen 
contends were ignored, actually are included in the valuation of 
his practice. 
Dr. Sorensen has shown the district court valued the 
practice differently than he would and perhaps even contrary to 
the testimony of his expert witness. That does not constitute an 
abuse of discretion. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF EXPENSES FOR EXPERT WITNESSES 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CLEAR ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION. 
Dr. Sorensen's final argument challenges the award of 
expert witness fees. The district court ordered the parties to 
bear the expense of their own expert witnesses, except the 
expense of Allan Heiskanen, a real estate appraiser, which the 
parties were to divide evenly. (R. 96; Decree f 23). Dr. 
0~k 
Sorensen contends (his brief at 39-41) expert witness fees may 
not be taxed as costs beyond the $14 per diem rate* permitted by 
Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-4 (1953) .6 He asks the Court to vacate 
that portion of the decree requiring him to pay one-half of Mr. 
Heiskanen's fee. The argument is not persuasive, because it is 
not factually accurate. 
On August 13, 1986, a pretrial conference was conducted 
by the Domestic Relations Commissioner, B. Maurice Richards. (R. 
55). The parties agreed at the conference to have their real 
property appraised by an appraiser who was acceptable to them 
both. The expense of the appraiser was borne initially by Dr. 
Sorensen; the decision of ultimate responsibility for payment was 
left to the district court for subsequent determination. The 
parties1 agreement is memorialized in handwritten notes appearing 
on the bottom of the Pretrial Conference Work Sheet. (R. 54). 
They read: 
Parties are having the real property appraisal by 
an agreed appraiser — Def. to pay costs initially and 
court decides who finally pays. 
The parties later selected Mr. Heiskanen as their appraiser. 
Their understanding, specifically including the selection of Mr. 
Section 21-5-4 provides: 
Every witness legally required or in good faith 
requested to attend upon a city or district court or a 
grand jury is entitled to $14 per day for each day in 
attendance and 30 cents for each mile actually and 
necessarily traveled in going only; provided, that in 
case of a witness's attending from without the state in 
a civil case, mileage for such witness shall be allowed 
and taxed for the distance actually and necessarily 
traveled within the state in going only. 
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Heiskanen, was made a part of the pre-trial order on September 4, 
1986: 
An appraisal of the family home occupied by 
plaintiff, the dental office occupied by defendant, and 
the farm in Liberty, Utah, will be made by Alan 
Heiskanen with the cost of said appraisals to be paid 
by defendant and the ultimate responsibility for the 
cost of said appraisals to be determined by the Court. 
(R. 57-58). Dr. Sorensen's trial attorney, Mr. Echard, approved 
the form of the order. (R. 59). He did not file an objection to 
it; neither did he request further hearing on it. Dr. Sorensen 
is deemed to have consented to the order. 
Mr. Heiskanen appraised the properties and testified at 
trial about their value. (Tr. Vol. I at 6-36). The district 
court then divided evenly between the parties the responsibility 
for payment of his expenses. That is precisely what the parties 
and the pretrial proceedings contemplated. 
Dr. Sorensen supports his argument with a single case, 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980). It is not inapposite to 
the district court's decision. In Kerr, the parties did not 
agree to an allocation between them of expert witness fees and in 
the absence of a stipulation, the district court unilaterally 
allocated the fees as it chose. The Sorensen's pretrial 
stipulation factually distinguishes this case from Kerr. 
The Court of Appeals concluded (opinion at 832-833) the 
Sorensens had agreed in their pretrial stipulation that the 
ultimate responsibility for payment of Mr. Heiskanen1s fee would 
be determined by the district court. The stipulation was binding 
on Dr. Sorensen, unless he could demonstrate good cause to 
warrant relief. Dr. Sorensen simply did not agree with Mr. 
25 
Heiskanen's valuation of the parties' property, and that 
difference of opinion, said the Court of Appeals, is not 
sufficient good cause. 
There is an additional consideration. Nothing 
indicates the witness fee was awarded as a "cost.1" Rather, the 
fee was a "litigation expense," much like attorney's fees. Such 
expenses ordinarily are not recoverable by the party prevailing 
in litigation. Divorce proceedings are different, however. 
Section 30-3-3 allows the district court discretion to award a 
party such sums as will permit that party to bring or defend a 
divorce action. Historically, the statute has permitted an award 
of attorney's fees, so long as the requesting party showed need 
and the reasonableness of the fee. An expert witness, under 
appropriate circumstances, is as necessary to the successful 
prosecution or defense of an action as an attorney. The district 
court had discretion to award Mrs. Sorensen a portion of her 
expert witness fees. 
ARGUMENT ON CROSS-PETITION 
Summary of Argument 
Mrs. Sorensen testified of her financial need for an 
award of attorney's fees and her attorney proferred evidence 
about the fees. Dr. Sorensen's attorney accepted the proffer and 
stipulated that if Mrs. Sorensen's attorney were called as a 
witness, he would testify the fees were reasonable and should be 
awarded. No contrary evidence was offered. There was sufficient 
evidence on which to base the award of attorney's fees. 
Mrs. Sorensen successfully defended the appeal before 
the Court of Appeals. It was an abuse of the Court's discretion 
not to award her attorney's fees on appeal. 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO MRS. 
SORENSEN WAS SUPPORTED BOTH BY EVIDENCE AND BY A STIPULATION 
AT TRIAL BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
The district court awarded Mrs. Sorensen $2,000 for 
attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals correctly noted that in 
order to recover attorney's fees in a divorce action, " . . . the 
moving party must set forth evidence, 1) demonstrating that the 
award is reasonable, and 2) establishing the financial need of 
the requesting party compels the award." Sorensen v. Sorensen, 
supra at 832. (Footnote omitted.) The Court of Appeals 
determined Mrs. Sorensen had adequately demonstrated sufficient 
need.7 The Court said it could not find sufficient evidence in 
the record about the "reasonableness" of the fee award, however. 
It believed appellate counsel for Mrs. Sorensen had conceded no 
evidence had been offered about the "reasonableness" of the fees; 
Dr. Sorensen's trial counsel had stipulated to the truthfulness 
of billing statements proferred by Mrs. Sorensen's trial counsel, 
but that he had not stipulated to the fees' reasonableness; and, 
neither the decree of divorce nor the written findings of fact 
and conclusions of law make reference to the reasonableness of 
the fees. On that basis, the Court concluded the evidence was 
Mrs. Sorensen testified she had incurred substantial 
attorney's fees for the maintenance of the action. (Tr. Vol. I 
at 145). She also testified she had no income other than the 
temporary support she was then receiving from her husband. (Tr. 
Vol. I at 148). 
insufficient to sustain the award of attorney's fees, and it 
reversed that portion of the decree of divorce. 
The Court of Appeals' decision is not correct. The fee 
award was reasonable and the record reflects it. 
First, Mrs. Sorensen's appellate counsel has never 
conceded that evidence was not offered at trial regarding the 
reasonableness of the attorney's fees incurred. The Court of 
Appeals was mistaken. 
Second, the reasonableness of the attorney's fees was 
sufficiently established at trial. On the first morning of 
trial, Mrs. Sorensen was examined by her trial counsel, Tim 
Healy, about the attorney's fees she had incurred: 
Q. Is it also correct, Mrs. Sorensen, in this 
particular matter, that you have incurreid substantial 
attorney fees in connection with the preparation and 
trial of this case? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. And is it correct, Mrs. Sorensen, that those 
attorney fees are in the neighborhood of $3,700.00? 
MR. ECHARD: Well, I'm going to object, Your 
Honor. I think the time—do you intend to present 
testimony later on? 
MR. Healy: I could do that if you would like. We 
have a copy of the [billing] statement or whatever. 
MR. ECHARD: If we could review that statement 
over lunchtime, they shouldn't question what it is 
approximately, I think I could accept Counsel's 
statements. 
THE COURT: Well, you talk about it over lunchtime 
and see if you could proffer that. 
MR. Healy: That's fine. 
(Tr. Vol. I at 145-146). Later that day, Mrs. Sorensen's 
attorney proffered the amount of his fees as itemized on his 
billing statement (Tr. Ex. V) and he was prepared to testify 
about the underlying justification for them: 
MR. Healy: Your Honor, we have also agreed that I 
would proffer to the Court at this time the attorney 
fees and state what this is based on. 
(Tr. Vol. I at 214). (Emphasis added.) The district court then 
asked Mr. Echard to stipulate to Mr. Healy's proffer. The court 
did not ask him to stipulate the fees were reasonable or that 
they should be awarded to Mrs. Sorensen. Rather, the court only 
asked Mr. Echard to stipulate that if Mr. Healy were called as a 
witness, Mr. Healy would testify his fees were reasonable and 
they should be awarded to Mrs. Sorensen. The precise exchange 
between the district court and Mr. Echard reads: 
THE COURT: Would you stipulate, Mr. Echard, that 
if Mr. Healy were to testify, that he would testify 
that his fee in this matter is $3,587.50, in addition 
therewith some witness subpoena fees. The stipulation 
would not go to the question of whether or not they are 
reasonable or whether they should be awarded, but that 
would be his testimony. May it be so stipulated? 
MR. ECHARD: It may, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court would receive the 
stipulation for that purpose. Maybe we ought to have 
this [billing statement] marked, Mr. Healy, marked as 
V. 
(Tr. Vol. I at 214-215). (Emphasis Added.) At the close of 
trial, Mr. Healy proffered evidence of additional fees incurred 
in the trial. Mr. Echard stipulated to the proffer with the same 
conditions accepted earlier: 
MR ECHARD: I agreed, Your Honor, that Counsel 
could make a proffer as to attorney fees. I would not 
agree to it, but I would accept it as to what he would 
testify to with that. 
MR. Healy: These are additional fees in 
connection with the further Hearing. 
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THE COURT: That [a second billing statement] is 
Exhibit X# and the Court will accept that as a proffer 
of additional fees in this matter. 
(Tr. Vol. II at 171). (Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Healy offered two billing statements as exhibits 
(Tr. Exs. V and X). They describe the work he performed, the 
hours expended, and the hourly rates charged. He was prepared to 
testify about them, but Mr. Echard stipulated to the substance of 
his anticipated testimony, including the reasonableness of the 
fees. 
Assuming, solely for the sake of discussion, the 
stipulations made at trial were not sufficient, the district 
court still possessed reliable information to assess the 
reasonableness of the attorney's fees. Remember, Mr. Healy's two 
billing statements (Tr. Exs. V and X) describe the work he 
performed, the total hours expended, and the hourly rates 
charged. His fees totaled $4,452.50 for 55.7 hours of service. 
His fees were not unreasonable in view of the pleadings prepared, 
negotiation of pretrial matters (temporary alimony and child 
support, child custody and a restraining order, for example), 
preparation of multiple trial witnesses, two days of trial, and 
the complexity of the issues (accounting, in particular) — all 
of which are readily apparent in the record and were obvious to 
the district court. The district court had sufficient 
information to assess the reasonableness of Mr. Healy's 
attorney's fees. 
In a dissenting opinion in Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 
P.2d 1276, 1281 (Utah 1987), Justice Durham encouraged the Court 
to take judicial notice of the reasonableness of a fee award when 
counsel's efforts were readily apparent in the record and were 
known, therefore, to the district judge who made the award. The 
Court of Appeals did the same in Maucrhan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 
156, 162 (Utah App. 1989), a case strikingly similar to this one. 
The Court canvassed the record and noted the efforts of counsel. 
It concluded the district court had sufficient information to 
assess the fee award and deferred to the district court's 
assessment of reasonableness. 
II. MRS. SORENSEN IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR 
DEFENDING THE APPEAL IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS. 
The district court entered a decree of divorce, 
dissolving the marriage between the parties and dividing their 
marital assets. Dr. Sorensen was unwilling to abide by the 
court's judgment and he filed an appeal. Mrs. Sorensen filed a 
brief with the Court of Appeals and, among other issues, asked 
for an award of the attorney's fees she would incur in the 
appeal. Brief of Respondent (before Court of Appeals) at 24. 
Mrs. Sorensen's lawyer repeated the request for fees at the close 
of his oral argument before the Court. 
On February 10, 1989, the Court rendered its opinion. 
The opinion did not address Mrs. Sorensen's request for 
attorney's fees. Accordingly, she filed a petition for rehearing 
on February 24, 1989, raising only the issue of attorney's fees. 
In an order dated March 2, 1989, the Court granted the petition 
and remanded the case to the district court for a determination 
of attorney's fees. On March 6, 1989, Dr. Sorensen filed a 
motion to set aside the Court's order. His motion was granted 
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without comment, and Mrs. Sorensen's petition for rehearing was 
denied on March 23, 1989. 
Attorney's fees on appeal may be granted to either 
party in a divorce action at the discretion of the court. Carter 
v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3-
(1953). When the record evidences a party's financial need and 
the party's arguments on appeal are affirmed, an award of 
attorney's fees is justified. Mauahan v. Maucrhan, 770 P.2d 156, 
162 (Utah App. 1989). 
It was an abuse of discretion to deny fees to Mrs. 
Sorensen under these circumstances. The record reflects she is 
in need of financial assistance. Moreover, the decree of divorce 
was upheld by the Court of Appeals on every issue except one: 
That part of the decree which ordered Dr. Sorensen to pay $2,000 
towards Mrs. Sorensen's trial fees. That is not a substantial 
modification of the decree. Workman v. Workman, 652 P,2d 931 
(Utah 1982) (attorney's fees will not be awarded if a decree of 
divorce is modified substantially on appeal). Mrs. Sorensen 
clearly is the prevailing party. Mountain States Broadcasting 
Co. v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah App. 1989) (". . . the 
party in whose favor the 'net' judgment is entered must be 
considered the 'prevailing party' and is entitled to an award of 
its fees.") 
REQUEST FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Elaine S. Sorensen hereby requests an award of the 
attorney's fees incurred in the proceedings before the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Sorensen asks the Court (i) to affirm the decision 
of the district court; (ii) to award her the costs she has 
incurred on appeal; and (iii) to award her attorney's fees for 
defending this appeal and the appeal before the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
DATED: February 5, 1990. 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
Reid E. Lewis 
Attorneys for Elaine S. Sorensen 
Plaintiff, Respondent and 
Cross-Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of February, 1990, 
I mailed four copies of the Brief of Respondent and Cross-
Petitioner to: 
Kent M, Kasting 
John D. Sheaffer 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Elaine S. SORENSEN, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Clifford G. SORENSEN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 870102-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 10, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied March 23, 1989. 
Husband appealed from divorce judg-
ment of the Second District Court, Davis 
County, Rodney S. Page, J., distributing 
marital property. The Court of Appeals, 
Billings, J., held that* (1) goodwill of hus-
band's solo dental practice was marital as-
set properly subject to equitable distribu-
tion, and (2) trial court improperly awarded 
wife attorney fees since there was no proof 
of reasonableness of fees incurred. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part 
Jackson, J., concurred in part and dis-
sented in part and filed an opinion. 
1. Divorce <s=»286<5) 
In divorce proceeding, determining and 
assigning values to marital property is mat-
ter for trial court and appellate court will 
disturb those determinations absent show-
ing of clear abuse of discretion. 
2. Trial <s=»139.1(3), 140(1) 
Assessing weight and credibility of ex-
pert witness testimony is matter for trier 
of fact 
3. Divorce «=»252.3(1) 
Goodwill of husband's solo dental prac-
tice was marital asset subject to valuation 
and equitable distribution in divorce action. 
4. Divorce <s=>253(3) 
Evaluation of goodwill attributable to 
one party's business for purposes of mak-
ing equitable distribution is question of 
fact and is dependent on particular circum-
stances of case; in order to establish good-
will of divorcing spouse's professional prac-
tice as marital asset, party must produce 
sufficient expert testimony to show that 
goodwill constitutes valued business asset, 
independent of continued presence of pro-
fessional spouse, and trial courts may con-
sider any legitimate valuation method that 
measures present value of goodwill by tak-
ing into account past results and not post-
marital efforts of professional spouse. 
5. Divorce «=»253(4) 
In making equitable distribution of 
goodwill in divorce proceeding, trial court 
should make specific findings, first indicat-
ing whether goodwill exists under particu-
lar circumstances of case, and if so, its 
value; finding should clearly state evidence 
upon which valuations are based, and pref-
erably, valuation method or methods on 
which court relied. 
6. Divorce «=»253(3) 
One factor that clearly should not be 
considered in valuation of goodwill of pro-
fessional spouse's practice for purposes of 
equitable distribution is professional 
spouse's future-earning capacity. 
7. Appeal and Error «=>1008.1(4) 
Trial court's fundamental role in adver-
sary process is to judge credibility of wit-
nesses, and he or she is free to choose 
among expert testimony; appellate court 
will give weight to fact that trial court 
observed witnesses and their manner of 
testifying and accepted one version of facts 
rather than opposite. 
8. Evidence «=>572 
Valuation of $62,000 placed on good-
will of husband's dental practice for pur-
poses of equitable distribution was suffi-
ciently supported by testimony of wife's 
expert, who was employed by brokerage 
firm that had been in business over 18 
years and sold more than 250 dental prac-
tices and who had personally been involved 
in 12 appraisals and six sales of practices; 
expert derived goodwill figure by consider-
ing factors such as history of earnings, 
length of time husband had been in prac-
tice, number of patients, location of prac-
tice, facilities and equipment, accounts re-
ceivable, and transferability of profits to 
DrosDective buver. goodwill valno ov. 
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pressed as factor equaling 34% of gross 
receipts was on low end of scale for dental 
practices in state, and husband's expert 
who attempted to rebut testimony was not 
involved in sale and valuation of dental 
practices. 
9. Divorce <*=>253(3) 
Trial court properly considered ac-
counts receivable in valuing husband's den-
tal practice for purposes of equitable distri-
bution. 
10. Divorce «=»286(9) 
Even assuming that trial court failed 
to consider full amount of accounts payable 
in its valuation of husband's dental practice 
for purposes of equitable distribution, such 
mistake was harmless error considering 
that both parties to action were awarded 
approximately $131,000 in marital assets 
and that property distributions in divorce 
actions were not required to be equal, but 
rather equitable. 
11. Divorce *=>226 
In order to recover attorney fees in 
divorce action, moving party must set forth 
evidence demonstrating that award is rea-
sonable, and establishing financial need of 
requesting party. 
12. Divorce «=»226 
Trial court improperly awarded wife 
attorney fees in divorce action, as there 
was no evidence offered regarding "reason-
ableness of fees" charged; wife's attorney 
proffered exhibit reflecting only time spent 
and rates charged, and there was no evi-
dence relating to reasonableness of number 
of hours, usual hourly rate for divorce 
cases in community nor overall reasonable-
ness of fee. 
13. Divorce «=>227(1) 
Trial court properly required husband 
to pay portion of fee for expert appraiser 
which was in excess of statutory rate, as 
parties had agreed by pretrial stipulation to 
have their real property appraised by ex-
pert and further agreed that his fee would 
be paid initially by husband with ultimate 
responsibility for payment to be deter-
mined by trial court U.C.A.1953, 21-5-
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Kent Kasting, Salt Lake City, for appel-
lant 
Reid E. Lewis and Jeffrey Robinson, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent 
Before GARFF, BILLINGS and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
In this divorce action, defendant/appel-
lant, Clifford G. Sorensen ("Dr. Sorensen") 
appeals the trial court's property valuation 
and distribution, award of attorney fees to 
Mrs. Sorensen, and the allocation of expert 
witness fees. We affirm the property dis-
tribution and allocation of expert witness 
fees but reverse the award of attorney 
tees. 
FACTS 
The parties were married on April 10, 
1975. Mrs. Sorensen was a registered 
nurse. Dr. Sorensen was a dentist and had 
practiced in Roy, Utah for approximately 
six years prior to the marriage. The par-
ties have four children, ages 10, 9, 6, and 3 
at the time of trial There is no dispute as 
to custody, child support, or alimony., 
During the marriage, Dr. Sorensen con-
tinued to practice as a dentist in Roy. Mrs. 
Sorensen returned to school and received 
her masters degree in nursing and also 
completed all the necessary courses for a 
Ph.D. in public health. 
At trial, Mrs. Sorensen claimed Dr. Sor-
ensen's dental practice, a professional cor-
poration, was a marital asset subject to 
valuation and distribution by the court 
Mrs. Sorensen called Dr. Richard Austin as 
an expert witness* Dr. Austin had been a 
dentist in Utah for four and one-half years. 
Dr. Austin also worked for a Denver com-
pany that brokered the purchase and sale 
of dental practices. His brokerage compa-
ny had appraised and sold approximately 
250 dental practices. Dr. Austin had par-
ticipated in 12 appraisals and 7 sales of 
dentistry practices. Six of the 7 sales oc-
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Dr. Austin testified that the fair market 
value of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice was 
$100,060 and that dental practices in Utah 
generally sold for 90 to 95 percent of their 
appraised value. In connection with his 
testimony, Dr. Austin presented the trial 
court his written valuation of Dr. Soren-
sen's dental practice. Dr. Austin's valua-
tion was based on unaudited information 
previously provided by Dr. Sorensen 
through discovery. Dr. Austin's calcula-
tion was the combined value of three com-
ponents: 1) tangible assets, ic, furniture 
and equipment—$15,330, 2) accounts re-
ceivable—$22,170,' and 3) intangible assets 
or "goodwill"—$62,560, for a total market 
value of $100,060. Dr. Austin further tes-
tified "[i]t is important to realize that this 
evaluation has been made [according to] 
the standards that are currently acceptable 
for this purpose. Existing market trends 
in the state of Utah for the disposition of 
dental practices were given consideration." 
To determine the goodwill value, Dr. 
Austin reviewed the income and expenses 
of Dr. Sorensen's practice for a three year 
period, 1983 through 1985. During this 
time, Dr. Sorensen averaged $184,000 in 
gross receipts. Dr. Austin testified that 
the "goodwill" value of dental practices he 
had appraised in Utah ranged from 15 to 80 
percent of their gross receipts depending 
on a number of factors. These factors 
include: the length the practice had been 
operating, location, number of patients, 
profitability, currency of accounts receiva-
ble, and an evaluation of the transferability 
of profit to a prospective buyer. Applying 
the foregoing factors to Dr. Sorensen's 
practice, Dr. Austin concluded the goodwill 
value was 34 percent of the gross receipts 
for a total of $62,560. Specifically, Dr. 
Austin testified: 
The age of a dental practice plays an 
important role in determining its value. 
Dr. Sorensen has been practicing in the 
community for a number of years and 
has established a good reputation for 
family dental care. The number of pa-
1. To arrive at a dollar value attributable to 
accounts receivable. Dr. Austin excluded all ac-
counts unpaid over 120 days, and discounted 
tients of record and the maintenance of 
healthy production figures attest to this. 
Dr. Sorensen's practice location is on a 
very highly traveled street and is in an 
excellent location for visibility and pubbc 
exposure. Parking is convenient The 
office space is adequate and functional. 
However, updating equipment and lease-
hold improvements would increase the 
value of this practice. 
The aging of the accounts receivable indi-
cates that the practice has a healthy col-
lection policy and that the receptionist is 
doing a good job of collecting. 
The community of Roy has a healthy, 
growing economy. The influx of new 
dentists into the area quickly absorbs 
patients seeking new dentists. 
In response to Dr. Austin's testimony, 
Dr. Sorensen called two expert witnesses: 
Mr. Gerald Deters, his accountant, and Mr. 
Roger Nuttal, a CPA. Mr. Deters com-
pared the respective income, expenses, and 
profit of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice for 
the years 1974 and 1986, and concluded 
that since the date of the marriage, Dr. 
Sorensen's practice was "a little bit bigger, 
a little better." Mr. Deters further testi-
fied that goodwill had never been shown as 
an asset of Dr. Sorensen's professional cor-
poration. 
Dr. Sorensen also called Mr. Roger Nut-
tal, who evaluated the Sorensen's entire 
financial situation, both business and per-
sonal. Mr. Nuttal testified that he believed 
some goodwill existed, but found Dr. Aus-
tin's calculations "very questionable." He 
further testified that Dr. Austin failed to 
consider $10,129 in accounts payable. 
Thereafter, relying primarily on Dr. Aus-
tin's calculations less the amount for ac-
counts payable, Mr. Nuttal testified that 
Dr. Sorensen's dental practice was worth 
approximately $87,096. 
With reference to the dental practice, the 
trial court concluded with our emphasis: 
[Defendant has continued to practice 
dentistry in Roy, Utah, during the course 
of the marriage and has an office with an 
the resulting amount by 12 percent to account 
for uncoUectibles. 
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excellent location; has continued to build 
his clientele; has a good fee collection 
record and a good reputation in the com-
munity. 
The Court finds the total value of the 
practice to be $100,000 including ac-
counts receivable and all equipment with 
the exception of the computer. 
That dental practices usually sell for ap-
proximately 90 percent of the appraised 
value 
The defendant should be awarded the 
dental practice including all equipment 
and accounts receivable the Court feel-
ing that the large portion of the value 
of the practice has to do with good will 
and reputation built up in the practice 
over the years of marriage. The only 
reasonable way to value said practice is 
to proportion it based upon the years the 
parties have been married during the 
practice. Based on their eleven years of 
marriage over sixteen years of practice 
for the purpose of distribution, the Court 
values the practice at 69 percent of the 
value as found above for a total of $62,-
100. 
The trial court then ordered essentially 
an equal division of the parties' property 
crediting $62,100 to Dr. Sorensen for his 
practice and an equal amount of offsetting 
property to Mrs. Sorensen. 
The trial court also ordered Dr. Sorensen 
to contribute $2,000 toward Mrs. Soren-
sen's attorney fees. Mrs. Sorensen testi-
fied she had incurred fees, but she had no 
present income to pay those fees. Mrs. 
Sorensen's attorney proffered an exhibit 
reflecting the time spent and the rates 
charged. Dr. Sorensen's counsel stipulated 
that the proffer could be received but ex-
pressly refused to stipulate that the fees 
were reasonable. 
The trial court also ordered the parties to 
bear the expense of their own expert wit-
nesses, with the exception of Allan Heiska-
nen, a real estate appraiser, whose fees the 
parties were ordered to split The Soren-
sens, by pretrial stipulation, agreed to have 
their real property appraised by Mr. Heis-
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expense of the appraiser was to be paid 
initially by Dr. Sorensen with the ultimate 
responsibility for payment to be deter-
mined by the trial court 
Dr. Sorensen raises three issues on ap-
peal. First, he claims the trial court erred 
in its valuation of his dental practice by, 1) 
determining that "goodwill" was a marital 
asset subject to equitable distribution, 2) 
including Dr. Sorensen's accounts receiva-
ble in the valuation of the dental practice, 
and 3) failing to consider accounts payable 
in its evaluation of the practice. Second, 
Dr. Sorensen claims the trial court erred in 
awarding Mrs. Sorensen a portion of her 
attorney fees. Finally, Dr. Sorensen 
claims the trial court erred by ordering him 
to pay a portion of Mr. Heiskanen's expert 
witness fee. 
I. VALUATION OF DENTAL 
PRACTICE 
[1,2] In a divorce proceeding:, "deter-
mining and assigning values to marital 
property is a matter for the trial court and 
this Court will not disturb those determina-
tions absent a showing of clear abuse of 
discretion." Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83, 
84 (Utah CtApp.1987). "In making such 
orders, the trial court is permitted broad 
latitude, and its judgment is not to be light-
ly disturbed, so long as. it exorcises its 
discretion in accordance with the standards 
set by this Court" Newmeyer v. Newmey-
ert 745 P.2d 1276, 1277 ([Utah 1987) (cita-
tions omitted). An appealing party bears 
the burden of establishing that the trial 
court violated those standards "or that the 
trial court's factual findings upon which 
the [property] division is grounded are 
clearly erroneous under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 52(a)." I± Furthermore, as-
sessing the weight and credibility of expert 
witness testimony is a matter for the trier 
of fact See Yelderman v. Yelderman, 
669 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1983) ("it is within 
the province of the fact finder to believe 
those witnesses or evidence it chooses"). 
Goodwill 
[3] In its property distribution, the trial 
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which represents the trial court's assess-
ment of the total value of Dr. Sorensen's 
dental practice. As part of its calculations, 
the trial court assigned a substantial value 
to the goodwill of Dr. Sorensen's profes-
sional dental corporation. On appeal, we 
must first determine whether goodwill is 
properly considered a marital asset subject 
to distribution, and if so, whether there is 
competent evidence to support the trial 
court's finding as to the goodwill value of 
Dr. Sorensen's professional corporation. 
In a divorce action, trial courts should 
distribute marital property and income in 
order that 'the parties may readjust their 
lives to their new circumstances as well as 
possible." Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 
1076, 1078 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). 
"[M]arital property 'encompasses all of the 
assets of every nature possessed by the 
parties, whenever obtained and from what-
ever source derived '" Id. at 1079 (ci-
tation omitted). The Utah Supreme Court 
has emphasized: 
[WJhether a resource is subject to distri-
bution does not turn on whether the 
spouse can presently use or control it, or 
on whether the resource can be given a 
present dollar value. The essential cri-
terion is whether a right to the benefit 
or asset has accrued in whole or in part 
during the marriage. 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 
432-33 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added). 
The question of whether the goodwill of 
a professional corporation is a marital as-
set, properly subject to equitable distribu-
tion in a divorce action, is one of first 
impression for this Court,2 although the 
Utah Supreme Court recently addressed 
2. In Stevens v. Stevens, 754 ?2d 952 (Utah CL 
App.1988), Judge Jackson, writing for this 
Court, found that the appellant confused "good-
will" with "going concern value," and failed to 
prove the existence of goodwill by competent 
evidence. Id. at 956-57. 
3. See, e.g, Rostel v. Rostel, 622 PJd 429 (Alaska 
1981). rev'd on other grounds, 749 ?2d 343 
(Alaska 1988) (close corporation—husband and 
wife sole shareholders); Mitchell v. Mitchell 152 
Ariz. 317. 732 ?2d 208 (1987) (partnership); 
Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194. 741 S.W.2d 640 
(1987) (professional corporation); In re Mar-
riage of Watts, 171 CaLApp3d 366, 217 CaLRptr. 
the issue indirectly in Gardner v. Gardner, 
748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). In Gardner, 
the trial court awarded Dr. Gardner his 
retirement account and medical assets 
without assigning them a present value. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court's decision, and remanded for further 
proceedings for a valuation of the medical 
assets and retirement account In consid-
ering the valuation and distribution of the 
doctor's medical assets, the Court stated 
"[t]he ability of a business to generate 
income from its continued patronage is 
commonly referred to as good will. Good 
will is properly subject to equitable dis-
tribution upon divorce." Id. at 1080 n. 1 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). The 
dissent chastises us for our reliance on the 
language in Gardner claiming Justice 
Stewart intended to limit his endorsement 
of goodwill as a marital asset to multi-
membered professional corporations. 
However, Justice Stewart does not make a 
distinction as to the "type" of business 
entity and in fact, in Gardner, the Utah 
Supreme Court relied on Dugan v. Dugan, 
92 NJ. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983), and In re 
Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash.2d 324, 588 
P.2d 1136 (1979), to support its conclusion 
that the goodwill of a professional corpora-
tion is subject to distribution in a divorce 
proceeding. See Gardner, 748 P.2d at 
1080 n. 1. Both decisions involved solely 
owned or operated professional practices. 
The prevailing view among 20 other jur-
isdictions is that the goodwill of a profes-
sional practice or business is a marital as-
set, subject to valuation, and therefore, 
should be considered in a divorce proceed-
ing.2 Jurisdictions holding to the contrary 
301 (1985) (professional corporation); In re 
Marriage of Nichols, 43 CoIoj\pp. 383, 606 ?2d 
1314 (1979) (professional association); Wright 
v. Wright, 469 JL2d 803 (Del.Fam.CL 1983) (sole 
practitioner); In re Marriage of White, 98 111. 
AppJd 380. 53 IlLDec 786. 424 N.E^d 421 
(1981) (professional corporation); Heller v. Hel-
ler, 672 S.WJd 945 (Ky.CLApp.1984) (profes-
sional corporation); Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 
148 MickApp. 151. 384 N.WJZd 112 (1986) (pro-
fessional corporation); Roth v. Roth, 406 N.W. 
2d 77 (Minn.Ctj\pp.l987) (sole practitioner); 
Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1987) 
(partnership); In re Marriage of Hull, 712 PJZd 
1317 (Mont.1986) (professional corporation): 
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include Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Penn-
sylvania, Wisconsin, Texas, and Tennes-
see.4 
The most common legal definition de-
scribes "goodwill" as: 
[TJhe advantage or benefit, which is ac-
quired by an establishment, beyond the 
mere value of the capital, stock, funds, 
or property employed therein, in conse-
quence of the general public patronage 
and encouragement which it receives 
from constant or habitual customers, on 
account of its local position, or common 
celebrity, or reputation for skill or afflu-
ence, or punctuality, or from other acci-
dental circumstances or necessities, or 
even from ancient partialities or preju-
dices.5 
Taylor v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721. 386 N.W.2d 851 
(1986) (professional corporation); Dugan v. Du-
gan, 92 NJ. 423. 457 A^d 1 (1983) (sole practi-
tioner); Hertz v. Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 657 R2d 
1169 (1983) (professional corporation); Dorton 
v. Dorton, Tl N.CApp. 667. 336 S.E^d 415 
(1985); Jondahl v. Jondahl, 344 N.W.2d 63 (N.D. 
1984) (sole practitioner); In re Marriage of Rett-
ing, 66 Orj\pp. 284. 673 P.2d 1360 (1983) (sole 
practitioner); Fait v. Fait, 345 N.W.2d 872 (SJX 
1984) (professional association); In re Marriage 
of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236. 692 P.2d 175 (1984) 
(professional corporation). 
4e See, eg., Powell v. Powell, 231 Kan. 456. 648 
P.2d 218 (1982); Pearce v. Pearce, 482 So.2d 
108 (La.Ct.App. 1986) (expert testimony failed to 
prove sole proprietorship had goodwill value); 
Carter v. Carter, 616 S.W.2d 543 (Mo.Ct.App. 
1981); Beasley v. Beasley, 359 Pa^uper. 20. 518 
A^d 545 (1986); Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 
2d 327. 309 N.W.2d 343 (CLApp.1981); Nail v. 
Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.1972) (no goodwill in 
sole proprietorship). But see Geesbreght v. 
Geesbreght, 570 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.CivJVpp.1978) 
(goodwill of professional corporation is marital 
asset). See also. Smith v. Smith, 709 S.W.2d 588 
(Tenn.CtApp.1985). 
5. Comment. Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing 
Professional Goodwill or Community Property at 
Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 Tui L 
Rev. 313, 314 (1981) (quoting J. Story. Commen-
taries on the Law of Partnerships § 99, at 170 
(6th ed. 1868))« See also Hanson v. Hanson, 
Mitchell v. Mitchell: The Division of Professional 
Goodwill Upon Marital Dissolution, 11 Harv. 
Women's LX 147, 149 (1988); and Jackson v. 
Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81. 415 P.2d 667, 670 
(1966). 
6. Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423. 457 A.2d 1. 4 
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In the accounting field, goodwill is re-
ferred to generally as " 'the summation of 
all the special advantages, not otherwise 
identifiable, related to a going concern. It 
includes such items as a good name, capa-
ble staff and personnel, high credit stand-
ing, reputation for superior products and 
services, and favorable location.'"* 
'There can be no doubt that goodwill 
exists. It is a legally protectable inter-
est"7 Goodwill has been held to consti-
tute "property" within the meaning of the 
fourteenth amendment due process clause * 
and is subject to being bought and sold.9 
Goodwill may be present whether the busi-
ness form is a sole proprietorship, partner-
ship,1* association, joint venture, or corpo-
ration.11 
Intermediate Accounting 283 (7th ed. standard 
vol. 1982)). 
7. Dugan, 457 A^d at 4. 
8. McDermott v. City of Seattle, 4 RSupp. 855, 
857 (D.Wash.1933) (and citations therein). 
9. Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 81. 415 P.2d 
667. 670 (1966). 
10. In Mitchell v. Mitchell the Arizona Supreme 
Court noted that there is confusion in this area 
of the law, partly because the analysis of wheth-
er goodwill should be considered an asset often 
involves the dissolution of a partnership which 
is sometimes controlled by a partnership agree-
ment, as opposed to the dissolution of a mar-
riage. 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987). 
The Arizona Court described the dissolution of a 
marriage as follows: 
A professional practice goes automatically to 
the spouse licensed to practice i t He is not 
selling out or liquidating, but continuing in 
business. Effectively, it is the case of the 
silent partner withdrawing from a going busi-
ness. And, if such partner is to receive fair 
compensation for her share, or her enforced 
retirement, it should be so evaluated. 
Id 
Such is the case in Jackson v. Caldwell, au-
thority relied on by Dr. Sorensen for the propo-
sition that goodwill should not be considered 
marital property subject to distribution in di-
vorce proceedings. See Jackson, 415 P.2d at 
670-71. 
11. See, eg., Dugan, 457 A^d at 4; Mitchell, 732 
P.2d at 210-11; Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945. 
947 (Ky.CtApp.1984); Hanson v. Hanson, 738 
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The overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions considering the issue find that good-
will is a property interest, and as such, it 
must be considered in divorce proceedings. 
Whether goodwill exists and has value in a 
particular case, is a question of fact Ac-
cordingly, we agree with the majority of 
jurisdictions and the dicta in Gardner v. 
Gardner, and hold that the goodwill of a 
professional practice is a marital asset sub-
ject to valuation and distribution in the 
appropriate circumstances. 
Judge Jackson, in his dissent, criticizes 
the approach taken by the Washington and 
California courts in valuing goodwill before 
they address whether it exists at all. 
Judge Jackson adamantly asserts that any 
approach to valuing goodwill should in-
volve a two-step inquiry: does goodwill ex-
ist in this particular entity, and if so, what 
is its value. Although some courts do go 
directly to the valuation issue, a conclusion 
that a value exists implicitly answers the 
first inquiry in the affirmative. More im-
portantly, however, we think our opinion 
clearly directs trial courts to engage in the 
two-part approach. 
We concede that there is a split of au-
thority on this issue, but we find those 
jurisdictions holding to the contrary unper-
suasive. Courts that refuse to recognize 
goodwill as a marital asset base their con-
clusions, generally, on three grounds. 
First, opponents contend that goodwill is 
not an asset separate and apart from the 
individual practitioner and in this respect, 
goodwill is analogous to a professional de-
gree.12 Second, they claim that goodwill is 
12. See Powell v. Powell 231 Kan.App.2d 456, 
646 P\2d 218, 223 (1982); Hotbrook v. Hotbrook, 
103 Wis^d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (CtJVpp. 
1981); Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 
1972). 
13. See Powett, 648 P.2d at 223; Hotbrook. 309 
N.WJd at 354; NaU, 486 S.W.2d at 764. 
14. See, e,g., Hotbrook, 309 N.W\2d at 354. 
15. See, &*, Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 
732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987); In re Marriage of 
Nichols, 43 CoIoApp. 383, 606 P.2d 1314. 1315 
(1979); Heller v. Heller, 672 S.W.2d 945. 948 
(Ky.CLApp.1984); Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423, 
457 A2d 1, 6 (1983). 
indistinguishable from future earning ca-
pacity and is valuable to the individual only 
to the extent that it assures substantial 
earnings in the future.13 Finally, oppo-
nents assert that goodwill is difficult to 
value, hence it should not be considered in 
divorce settlements.14 We address each of 
these arguments separately. 
In Holbrook v. Holbrook, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court expressed the view that 
goodwill does not "bestow on those who 
have an ownership interest in the business, 
an actual, separate property interest" 103 
Wis.2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (CtApp. 
1982). Accordingly, the Wisconsin Court 
determined that goodwill is more analogous 
to a professional degree than a property 
interest. Id. 
We disagree with Wisconsin's rationale. 
There are significant and distinctive differ-
ences between the goodwill of a profession-
al practice and a professional degree.15 
Unlike a professional degree, goodwill is 
traditionally defined as an intangible 
"property right" l< It is a separate and 
distinct asset, not merely a factor contribu-
ting to the earning capacity of the practi-
tioner. See In re Marriage of Hall, 103 
Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175,178 (1984). The 
theory underlying goodwill is that an on-
going business has a value beyond mere 
tangible assets. These intangible assets 
are independent of the proprietor, and as 
such, can be sold on an open market In re 
Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo.App. 383, 606 
?2A 1314, 1315 (19^9). In Nichols, the 
Colorado Court of Appeals stated: 
16. See, e.g.t In re Marriage of Nichols, 606 P2d 
at 1315. In addition to those authorities hold-
ing that goodwill is a marital asset, see note 3, 
supra, even those jurisdictions holding to the 
contrary, nonetheless find that good will is a 
property interest See, e.g., Powell v. Powell, 231 
Kan. 456. 648 ?2d 218. 222 (1982); Nail v. Nail, 
486 &W.2d 761. 763 (Tex.1972); Beasley v. Beas-
ley, 518 A2d 545. 552 (Pa^uper.1986); Pearce v. 
Pearce 482 SoJ2d 108, 111 (La.CLApp.1986). In-
stead, these cases typically find that the particu-
lar facts did not demonstrate that the goodwill 
had value, and therefore, goodwill per se should 
not be considered a marital asset See Powell 
648 P-2d at 222-24; Nail 486 S.W.2d at 764; 
Beasley, 518 A^d at 552; Pearce, 482 So.2d at 
111. 
SORENSEN v. 
CK* M 769 P.2d 820 
While we recognize that professional 
goodwill is not an asset which has an 
independent market value, it can, in con-
junction with the assets of the practice, 
be sold. This limited marketability dis-
tinguishes professional goodwill from the 
advanced educational degree, which, be-
cause it is personal to its holder and is 
non-transferable, [is] held not to be prop-
erty... . 
Id. 
When goodwill exists, it may well be 
regarded as "the most lucrative asset of 
some enterprises."17 
It is the property attributes of goodwill 
that distinguish it from a professional de-
gree, which we have held on prior occasions 
does not constitute marital property sub-
ject to distribution.18 
Several courts have found that "[t]he 
better analogy is to pension rights which 
are marital property." Mitchell v. Mitch-
ell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 211 (1987) 
(and citations therein). Both are property 
rights acquired during the marriage al-
though their enjoyment and benefits are 
deferred. Id Our Supreme Court has 
stated that marital property encompasses 
pension funds. Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988); Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1982). 
In Woodward, the Court declared with 
our emphasis: 
[Appellant's] argument fails to recognize 
that pension or retirement benefits are a 
17. Dugan, 457 AJd at 5. See also In re Marriage 
of Goger, 27 Or.App. 729. 557 ?2d 46, 47 (1976). 
18. See Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah 
CLApp.1987); Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 
(Utah CLApp.1987). In Petersen, we held that 
an educational degree is not encompassed with-
in the broad views of the concept of "property." 
It does not have an exchange value or any 
objective transferable value on an open mar-
ket. It is personal to the holder. It termi-
nates on death of the holder and is not inheri-
table. It cannot be assigned, sold, transfer-
red, conveyed, or pledged It is simply an 
intellectual achievement that may potentially 
assist in the future acquisition of property. 
In our view it has none of the attributes of 
property in the usual sense of that term.' 
737 P.2d at 240 (quoting In re Marriage of Gra-
ham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75. 77 (1978)). 
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form of deferred compensation by the 
employer. If the rights to those benefits 
are acquired during the marriage, then 
the court must at least consider those 
benefits in making an equitable distri-
bution of the marital assets. The right 
(emphasis in the original) to receive mo-
nies in the future is unquestionably . . . 
an economic resource, subject to eq-
uitable distribution based upon proper 
computation of its present dollar val-
ue.' »• 
Similarly, if goodwill can be shown by 
competent credible evidence to exist at the 
time of dissolution and that nt was acquired 
or accrued during the marriage, trial courts 
must "at least consider those benefits in 
making an equitable distribution of the 
marital assets." Id See also In re Mar-
riage of Lopez, 38 CaLApp.3d 93, 113 Cal. 
Rptr. 58, 68 (1974). 
The second major criticism of treating 
goodwill as a marital asset is that goodwill 
is indistinguishably tied to personal future 
earnings. Thus, if the practitioner (dies or 
retires, "nothing remains."10 
We believe to the contrary. We note at 
the outset, that goodwill is and must be 
distinguished from a professional practi-
tioner's future earning capacity, an issue 
more fully addressed below. A number of 
jurisdictions have held that goodwill is not, 
however, per se synonymous with future 
earning capacity.21 
In addition to those jurisdictions, one 
commentator opined that "[tjhere is no val-
19. Woodward, 656 ?2d at 432 (quoting Kikkert 
v. Kikkert, 177 NJ.Super. 471. 427 A2d 76. 78 
(1981), quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 NJ. 464, 
375 >L2d 659, 662 (1977)), aff'd, 88 NJ. 4, 438 
A^d 317 (1981). 
2a Powell v. Powell 231 Kan. 456, 648 ?J2d 218, 
223 (1982). See also, Hotbrook v. HoWrook, 103 
Wis^d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343, 354 (CtApp.1981) 
(goodwill is valuable only to the extent that it 
assures continued substantial future earnings). 
21. See, e.g., Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423, 457 
hid 1. 6 (1983); bt re Marriage of Lopez 38 
Cal.App.3d 93, 113 CaLRptr. 58. 67 (1974); In re 
Marriage of Hall 103 Washed 236, 692 P.2d 
175, 178 (1984). 
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id basis for the argument that since good-
will is essentially a measure of future earn-
ings, it cannot properly be treated as a 
marital asset " 2 Valuation and Dis-
tribution of Marital Property, § 23.05[2] 
at 23-69 (1988). The commentator further 
declared that "[i]t is an economic truism 
that the value of any income-producing as-
set is its capacity to produce future income. 
In this regard, goodwill is just like any 
other asset Goodwill differs only insofar 
as, unlike a stock or bond, it will not pro-
duce income by itself." Id 
The argument that goodwill disappears 
in a case where the practitioner dies or 
retires is also unpersuasive. The possibili-
ty of continued patronage, despite the ab-
sence of the selling practitioner, has 
present value to a prospective buyer of a 
professional practice. See In re Marriage 
of Nichols, 43 ColoJVpp. 383, 606 P.2d 
1314, 1315 (1979). Moreover, the value of 
goodwill frequently remains notwithstand-
ing the practitioner's death, resignation, or 
disability. See In re Marriage of White, 
98 Ill.App.3d 380, 53 IlLDec 786, 789, 424 
N.E.2d 421, 424 (1981). "If it were other-
wise, we are unable to conceive the basis 
for the popular practice of retaining the 
names of deceased or withdrawn members 
in many professional firms long after their 
death or withdrawal." Id The possibility 
of death or retirement of the practitioner 
may reduce the value of goodwill, but it 
does not in all circumstances eliminate its 
existence. In re Marriage of Hall, 103 
Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 178 (1984). 
When a professional retires or dies, his 
earning capacity also either retires or 
dies. Nevertheless, the goodwill that 
once attached to his practice may contin-
ue in existence in the form of established 
patients or clients, referrals, trade name, 
location and associations which now at-
tach to former partners or buyers of the 
practice [A] professional can trans-
port all of his skill (earning rapacity) to a 
new town, but patients or clients, reputa-
tion and referrals (goodwill) cannot al-
ways be transported. 
Id. If the facts in a particular case demon-
strate that there is no goodwill value re-
maining in the absence of the practitioner 
then a trial court may properly declare in 
its determination of a practice's worth, that 
there is no value attributable to goodwill. 
The third and most unpersuasive argu-
ment is that goodwill is difficult to value, 
therefore, it should not be considered in the 
distribution of marital assets. See, e.g., 
Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis.2d 327, 309 
N.W.2d 343, 354 (CtApp.1981). This also 
seems to be the position taken by the dis-
sent 
We concede that in some cases, valuing 
goodwill is difficult Even so, if a party's 
expert witness cannot adequately demon-
strate that goodwill has a present value, 
then there is simply an evidentiary defect 
and goodwill should not be considered. 
However, the mere fact that goodwill may 
be difficult to value or elusive in nature, 
does not justify ignoring or disregarding it 
altogether in the valuation of marital prop-
erty. In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 Colo. 
App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314, 1316 (1980); 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 317, 732 
P.2d 208, 211 (1987). As in Mitchell, "[w]e 
prefer to accept the economic reality that 
the goodwill of a professional practice has 
value, and it should be treated as property 
upon dissolution of the community, regard-
less of the form of business/' Mitchell, 
732 P.2d at 212. We are mindful that not 
every professional practice necessarily has 
goodwill. See, e.g., In re Marriage of 
Hall, 692 P.2d at 179. Some courts, how-
ever, hold that sole proprietorships per se 
do not have goodwill because the busi-
ness's existence depends exclusively on the 
professional spouse's continuing efforts. 
See, e.g.t Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 
(Tex. 1972). We are not prepared to rule so 
broadly. Instead, we emphasize that the 
issue is one of proof, and not the particular 
form the business takes. "It would be 
inequitable to hold that the form of the 
business enterprise can defeat the commu-
nity's interest in the professional goodwill. 
Such a result ignores the contribution made 
by the non-professional spouse to the suc-
cess of the professional " Mitchell, 
739 V9A of o n 
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Valuation of Goodwill 
Because we find that the goodwill of Dr. 
Sorensen's dental practice was properly 
considered by the trial court in its property 
distribution, we next address Dr. Soren-
sen's contention that the trial court erred in 
the value it ultimately placed on the good-
will of his dental practice. 
[4] "It is a difficult task at best to 
arrive at a value for the intangible compo-
nent of a professional practice attributable 
to goodwill." Mitchell v. Mitchell, 152 
Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 214 (1987). The 
valuation of goodwill is a question of fact 
and is dependent upon the particular cir-
cumstances.22 In order to establish that 
the goodwill of a divorcing spouse's profes-
sional practice is a marital asset, a party 
must produce sufficient expert testimony 
to show that the goodwill constitutes a 
valued business asset, independent of the 
continued presence of the professional 
spouse.23 Trial courts may consider any 
legitimate valuation method "that mea-
sures the present value of goodwill by tak-
ing into account past results, and not post-
marital efforts of the professional 
spouse " Poore v. Poore, 75 N.C.App. 
414, 331 S.E.2d 266, 271 (1985). 
Factors courts have frequently found to 
affect the value of goodwill include: 
[T]he age, health, and professional repu-
tation of the practitioner, the nature of 
the practice, the length of time the prac-
tice has been in existence, its past prof-
its, its comparative professional success, 
and the value of its other assets.24 
Similarly, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
observed that the value of goodwill may be 
shown in a number of ways. " 'Elements 
which may be considered are, length oi 
time the business has been in existence; 
22. Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 
640, 647 (1987); Carriker v. Carriker, 151 Ariz. 
296, 727 ?J2d 349f 350 (Ct.App.1986). Accord 
Poore v. Poore, 75 N.CApp. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266 
(1985); In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or.App. 729, 
557 P.2d 46 (1976); Hurley v. Hurley, 94 N.M. 
641. 615 P.2d 256 (1980). 
23. See Taylor v. Taylor, 222 Neb. 721. 386 
N.W.2d 851, 858 (1986); Hanson v. Hanson, 738 
S.W.2d 429. 434 (Mo.1987). 
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the nature and character of the business; 
its success or lack thereof; its average 
profits; and the probability of its continu-
ance under the same name.' " In re Mar-
riage of Goger, 2TJ Or.App. 729, 557 P.2d 
46, 47 (1976) (quoting Levene v. City of 
Salem, 191 Or. 182, 229 P.2d 255, 263 
(1951)). " 'Past profits may be established, 
and the value of the goodwill estimated 
therefrom as a basis, subject to being re-
duced by a showing of a depression in 
trade or other circumstances that would 
tend to make the business less valu-
able . . . . ' " Id. 
[51 Trial courts should make specific 
findings, first indicating whether goodwill 
exists under the particular circumstances 
of the case, and if so, its value. Findings 
should clearly state the evidence upon 
which the valuations are based, and prefer-
ably, the valuation method or methods on 
which the court relied. See Poore v. 
Poore, 75 N.C.App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266, 
272 (1985). 
[61 We emphasize, however, one factor 
that clearly should not be considered in the 
valuation of goodwill is the professional 
spouse's future earning capacity. Consist-
ent with our position that professional de-
grees are not assets capable of distribution, 
we similarly hold that the future earning 
capacity of the divorcing professional 
should not be considered. To consider fu-
ture earning capacity in the valuation of 
the professional corporation's goodwill 
would have the effect of double counting, 
as earning capacity is also utilized in deter-
mining an appropriate alimony award. 
See, e.g., Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 
(Utah 1985). 
[7,8] In this action, Mrs. Sorensen 
called Dr. Austin, an expert witness emi-
24. Poore, 331 S.E.2d at 271 (citing Hurley v. 
Hurley, 94 N.M. 641, 615 P.2d 256 (1980)); Ac-
cord In re Marriage of Goger, 27 Or App. 729, 
557 P.2d 46 (1976). See abo In re Marriage of 
Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 179 (1984); 
Hertz v. Hertz. 99 N.M. 320, 657 P.2d 1169. 1174 
(1983). 
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nently qualified to appraise dental practic-
es. Dr. Austin had practiced dentistry in 
Utah for approximately four and one-half 
years and worked for a firm which is in the 
business of appraising and selling dental 
practices. Dr. Austin's brokerage firm has 
been in business over eighteen years and 
sold more than 250 dental practices. Dr. 
Austin has personally been involved in 12 
appraisals and sold 6 practices in Utah. 
Based on financial information supplied 
by Dr. Sorensen, Dr. Austin determined 
that the goodwill value of the corporation 
was $62,560. The procedure employed by 
Dr. Austin is one commonly used by his 
brokerage firm, and is also consistent with 
the methodologies recognized and approved 
in other jurisdictions previously discussed 
herein.25 The goodwill figure was derived 
by considering factors such as a history of 
the corporation's earnings, the length of 
time Dr. Sorensen had been in practice, the 
number of his patients, the location of the 
practice, his facilities and equipment, ac-
counts receivable, and an evaluation of the 
transferability of profits to a prospective 
buyer. 
Dr. Austin further testified that the 
goodwill value of dental practices in Utah 
ranged from 15 to 80 percent of their gross 
receipts. Accordingly, based on an analy-
sis of the factors previously described, Dr. 
Austin calculated a 34 percent factor for 
goodwill and then reduced Dr. Sorensen's 
average gross receipts by 66 percent The 
34 percent goodwill factor was on the low 
end of the 15 to 80 percent which he testi-
fied had been used by his brokerage corpo-
ration to value and sell other Utah dental 
practices. 
To refute Dr. Austin's valuation, Dr. Sor-
ensen called Mr. Deters, his accountant, 
and Mr. Nuttal, a CPA. Neither witness 
demonstrated expertise in appraising den-
tal practices, and their testimony was virtu-
ally nonresponsive on the issue of a profes-
25. Although not specifically stated by either par-
ty. Dr. Austin appeared to use in part a market 
value methodology to value Dr. Sorensen's den-
tal practice. A market value approach has been 
cited with approval in other jurisdictions, see, 
e.g.. In re Marriage of Hall 103 Washed 236, 
sional corporation's goodwill. The trial 
court apparently chose to believe Dr. Aus-
tin, and we will not disturb the trial court's 
factual findings unless they are clearly er-
roneous. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). A trial 
court's fundamental role in the adversary 
process is to judge the credibility of wit-
nesses and he or she is free to choose 
among expert testimony. See Canning v. 
Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 329 (Utah CtApp. 
1987). See also Lochwood v. Lockwooa\ 
205 Neb. 818, 290 N.W.2d 636, 640 (1980). 
"[T]his court will give weight to the fact 
that the trial court observed the witnesses 
and their manner of testifying and accept-
ed one version of facts rather than the 
opposite." Id. 
Other jurisdictions have upheld a trial 
court choosing the testimony of one party's 
expert over the other's expert in the con-
text of valuing goodwill. See, e.g., Ko-
walesky v. Kowalesky, 148 Mich.App. 151, 
384 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1986); In re Mar-
riage of Hull, 712 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Mont 
1986); Wright v. Wright, 469 A.2d 803, 808 
(Del.Fam.Ctl983). In Wright, the Dela-
ware Court indicated that one of the impor-
tant considerations for its decision to ac-
cept one expert's testimony was that the 
husband's expert had never been involved 
in the sale or liquidation of like practices. 
469 A.2d at 808 (emphasis added). Similar-
ly, in Kowalesky, a case involving the valu-
ation of a dental practice, the Michigan 
Court of Appeals held that the trial court's 
valuation, which seemed to favor the plain-
tiff, was not clearly erroneous. The trial 
court's valuation was based on the plain-
tiffs expert testimony, and the appellate 
court noted that plaintiffs expert was "ac-
tively involved in the sale of dental prac-
tices and the valuation of those practic-
es." 384 N.W.2d at 115 (emphasis added). 
In Kowalesky, the court stated: "[defen-
dant's expert, a certified public accountant 
who has a number of dentists as clients, did 
jurisdiction, is the only acceptable methodology. 
See Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429, 435 
(Mo. 1987). Of the five methodologies, a market 
value approach often produces the most con-
servative estimate for goodwill. 2 Valuation 
and Distribution of Marital Property, 
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not have similar valuation experience [as 
plaintiffs expert]/' Id. 
We find these cases analogous. Dr. Aus-
tin has considerable experience in the valu-
ation and sale of dental practices. Con-
versely, Dr. Sorensen's experts both can-
didly admitted that they were not involved 
in the sale and valuation of dental practic-
es. 
Our able colleague in dissent takes a 
novel approach to the review of expert 
testimony. He goes even further than re-
jecting the expert found more credible by 
the trial court and adopting another. He 
gives his own "expert" opinion on the valu-
ation of Dr. Sorensen's professional corpo-
ration, ignoring the testimony of all the 
experts and the findings of the trial judge. 
We think he simply believes that as a mat-
ter of law, the goodwill of any professional 
association should not be valued and dis-
tributed in a divorce action. We believe 
the overwhelming authority is to the con-
trary. 
Based on the foregoing, we find the trial 
court's valuation of the goodwill of Dr. 
Sorensen's practice, relying on the testimo-
ny of Dr. Austin, was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
Accounts Receivable 
[9] Dr. Sorensen claims that the trial 
court improperly considered accounts re-
ceivable in the valuation of his dental prac-
tice. We disagree. 
Dr. Sorensen relies on Dogu v. Dogu, 652 
P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982). In Dogu, the trial 
court excluded $25,000 of accounts receiva-
ble in its consideration of the value of the 
defendant's professional corporation. 
Finding the trial court had not abused its 
discretion, the Utah Supreme Court sum-
marily stated "[t]he corporation's accounts 
receivable represent deferred income from 
which respondent may meet his ongoing 
26. See, e,g.9 Kopplin v. Kopplin, 74 Or«App. 368, 
703 P.2d 251. 253 (1985) (trial court did not err 
by discounting accounts receivable by 30 per-
cent); In re Marriage of Reiling, 66 Or.App. 284, 
673 ?2d 1360, 1365 (1983) (accounts receivable 
are oroDertv to be included in the valuation of a 
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alimony and child support obligations to 
appellant" Id. at 1309. 
We are not persuaded that this state-
ment from Dogu stands for the proposition 
that accounts receivable may never he con-
sidered in the valuation of a professional 
corporation. Dr. Sorensen has not, cited 
additional authority for this proposition, 
and we note other jurisdiction's commonly 
hold that accounts receivable may be con-
sidered in the property distribution.2* In 
fact, the Michigan Court of Appeal conclud-
ed that the trial court committed reversible 
error by failing to consider accounts re-
ceivable in its valuation of a dental prac-
tice. Kowalesky v. Kowalesky, 148 Mich. 
App. 151, 384 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1986). 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the 
trial court properly considered accounts re-
ceivable in its valuation of Dr. Sorensen's 
dental practice. 
Accounts Payable 
[10] Dr. Sorensen claims that Dr. Aus-
tin's valuation, which was apparently 
adopted by the trial court, failed to consid-
er $10,129 in accounts payable. The record 
is ambiguous on this point, but even if the 
full amount of the accounts payable was 
not considered, we find the error was 
harmless. 
Both parties to this action were awarded 
approximately $131,000 in marital assets. 
Property distributions in divorce actions 
need not be "equal" but rather "equitable." 
See generally Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 
695 (Utah 1985). "While equality is a wor-
thy goal, precise mathematical equality is 
not essential or required." Canning v. 
Canning, 744 P.2d 325, 329 (Utah CLApp. 
1987). Accordingly, we find that even if 
the trial court failed to consider the full 
amount of accounts payable in its calcula-
tions, such a mistake was harmless error 
considering the total property distribution. 
537, 538 (Colo.CtApp.1984) (accounts receivable 
represent debts for services already rendered 
and therefore constitute marital property); In re 
Marriage of Goldstein, 120 Ariz. 23, 583 P.2d 
1343, 1344 (1978) (trial court properly included 
accounts receivable as a marital asset). 
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Conclusion 
Based on Dr. Austin's testimony, the tri-
al court found that Dr. Sorensen's practice 
was worth $100,000 which included tangi-
ble assets, accounts receivable, and good-
will. The trial court further found that 
dental practices sell for approximately 90 
percent of their value, hence $90,000 was 
designated as the total value of the prac-
tice. The trial court then discounted this 
figure to account for the time the parties 
were married. The trial court found that 
Dr. Sorensen had been practicing for six-
teen years, and the parties had been mar-
ried for approximately eleven and one-half 
years. He further concluded the majority 
of the goodwill value of the practice had 
been established during the marriage.27 
Thus, he reduced or multiplied 11.5/16 or 
69 percent by $90,000 to arrive at $62,100, 
the total value he assigned Dr. Sorensen's 
dental practice as a marital asset 
Having concluded, 1) the trial court prop-
erly considered accounts receivable and 
goodwill in its valuation of Dr. Sorensen's 
dental practice, and 2) that failing to con-
sider accounts payable in its entirety was 
harmless error, we find the trial court's 
ultimate valuation of Dr. Sorensen's pro-
fessional dental corporation is supported by 
the record, and accordingly, the trial 
court's valuation is affirmed. 
II. ATTORNEY FEES 
[11,12] In order to recover attorney 
fees in a divorce action, the moving party 
must set forth evidence, 1) demonstrating 
that the award is reasonable, and 2) estab-
lishing the financial need of the requesting 
party compels the award.28 The relevant 
factors for determining the reasonableness 
27. Although the record does not conclusively 
establish that the goodwill value of Dr. Soren-
sen's practice increased at a constant rate 
throughout the marriage, there is also no con-
troverting evidence establishing that it did not. 
In fact, Dr. Sorensen presented very little credi-
ble testimony regarding the goodwill value of 
his corporation. Based on the evidence before 
the trial court, its method of apportionment was 
not an abuse of discretion. 
of the request include, the necessity for the 
number of hours dedicated, the reasonable-
ness of the rate charged in light of the 
difficulty of the case and the result accom-
plished, and the rates commonly charged 
for similar services in the community.25 
In the instant case, there is sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate Mrs. Sorensen's 
financial need. However, counsel for Mrs. 
Sorensen concedes that no evidence was 
offered regarding the "reasonableness" of 
the attorney fees incurred to maintain this 
action. Instead, Mrs. Sorensen's attorney 
proffered an exhibit reflecting only the 
time spent and the rates charged. Dr. 
Sorensen's counsel stipulated that the prof-
fer could be received, but expressly re-
fused to stipulate to the "reasonableness" 
of the fees. No evidence was presented 
relating to the reasonableness of the num-
ber of hours, the usual hourly rate for 
divorce cases in the community, nor the 
overall reasonableness of the fee. See Tal-
ley, 739 P.2d at 84. Additionally, the 
court's written findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, as well as the decree of di-
vorce, make no reference to the reasonable-
ness of the fees. Accordingly, we find the 
proffered testimony insufficient to sustain 
the award of attorney fees, and therefore, 
we reverse. 
III. EXPERT WITNESS PEES 
[13] Ordinarily, a trial court cannot re-
quire one party to pay the other party's 
expert witness fees in excess of the statu-
tory rate.* Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 
1384 (Utah 1980). See also Frampton v. 
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1980). 
However, in this case the parties agreed by 
pretrial stipulation to have their real prop-
28. Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380. 1384-85 (Utah 
1980); Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83. 84 (Utah 
Ct.App.1987). 
29. Kerr, 610 ?2d at 1384-85; Talley. 739 P.2d at 
84. 
30. Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-4(1) (1988). provides 
that "lejvery witness legally required or in good 
faith requested to attend . . . [trial], is entitled to 
$14 per day for each day in attendance and 30 
cents for each mile actually and necessarily 
traveled in going only." 
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erty appraised by Mr. Heiskanan. They 
further agreed that his fee would be paid 
initially by Dr. Sorensen, with the ultimate 
responsibility for payment to be deter-
mined by the trial court Stipulations are 
conclusive and binding on the parties un-
less good cause is demonstrated warrant-
ing relief therefrom. Higley v. McDonald, 
685 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1984). Dr. Soren-
sen has not set forth adequate justification 
to discharge his obligations under the pre-
trial stipulation. Simply because Dr. Sor-
ensen did not agree with the appraiser's 
valuation of the parties' real property, and 
instead chose to hire additional experts, 
does not constitute the requisite good 
cause. We find no abuse of discretion and 
affirm the trial court's allocation of the 
appraiser's fee. 
In sum, we affirm the trial court's valua-
tion and distribution of the parties' proper-
ty, and its allocation of expert witness fees. 
We reverse the award of attorney fees. 
GARFF, J., concurs. 
JACKSON, Judge (concurring in part 
and dissenting in part): 
I dissent from Part I of the majority 
opinion. 
Why are my colleagues and others in the 
legal system trying to create "new proper-
ty" in the context of marriage dissolution? 
Because of real and perceived injustices 
and inequities in property settlements in 
divorce decrees. As a result of their high 
income production, professionals are prime 
targets for the new, expansive definitions 
of property that include: (1) advanced univ-
ersity degrees; (2) licenses to practice; (3) 
equitable restitution; and (4) professional 
goodwill. Proponents of "new property" 
justify new definitions because they believe 
those definitions provide the divorce sys-
tem with additional means to be fair. 
STATUS OF THE "NEW 
PROPERTY" IN UTAH 
In Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 
241 (Utah CtApp.1987), this court held that 
"an advanced degree is or confers an intan-
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cannot properly be characterized as proper-
ty subject to division between the spouses." 
We also stated it is proper to consider 
advanced degrees or professional licenses 
when determining a spouse's ability to pro-
vide support, because an advanced degree 
is ordinarily an indicator of potential future 
earnings. 
But it is the discrepancy in their earning 
power which is the basis for alimony, not 
the discrepancy in their educations 
Whether a spouse's ability to provide 
support is the result of an advanced de-
gree or professional license is irrelevant 
to the analysis. The key is the spouse's 
ability. 
Id. at 243 (emphasis in original). 
In Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238, 
240-41 (Utah CtApp.1987), we reaffirmed 
our holding in Petersen, but acknowledged 
there will be situations involving advanced 
degrees and professional licenses where an 
award of non-terminable rehabilitative or 
reimbursement alimony would be appropri-
ate. See Petersen, 737 P.2d at 242 n. 4. In 
my view, reimbursement alimony is a re-
turn on investment in one spouse made by 
the financially supporting spouse. In con-
trast, rehabilitative alimony relates to lost 
investment in one's self, resulting in lost or 
lower future income stream. 
The need for reimbursement is most pro-
nounced in "threshold" divorces, where the 
parties split up before the benefits of one 
spouse's enhanced earning potential are re-
alized. Like Rayburn, the instant case 
does not involve a threshold divorce. Dr. 
Rayburn acquired his medical degree be-
fore the parties married. Mrs. Rayburn 
did not endure substantial financial sacri-
fices or defer her own education to assist 
his education. She shared the financial 
rewards of the degree for several years. 
His income production brought considera-
ble real and personal property into the mar-
riage that was equitably divided. 
Similarly, Dr. Sorensen acquired his de-
gree, license, and dental clientele and 
equipment six years before marriage. 
Mrs. Sorensen contributed nothing to assist 
him in those acquisitions; she made no 
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shared his financial rewards for eleven 
years and received considerable tangible 
property in the divorce decree, plus alimo-
ny and child support If the facts had 
warranted it, she could have been awarded 
non-terminable rehabilitative or reimburse-
ment alimony. 
In another recent divorce case involving 
a professional spouse, Martinez v. Mar-
tinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah CtApp.1988), the 
majority followed Petersen and Rayburn 
insofar as it held that a medical degree is 
not property subject to valuation and distri-
bution in a divorce. However, stating that 
Mrs. Martinez's situation required "more 
creative" analysis than the usual case, 
Martinez, 754 P.2d at 76, the majority then 
moved beyond rehabilitative or reimburse-
ment alimony to create new property by 
requiring an award of "equitable restitu-
tion" in addition to traditional alimony and 
property division.1 See ia\ at 78. In a 
footnote, the majority emphasized that eq-
uitable restitution would not be awarded 
where the marriage lasted for many years 
after receipt of the professional degree; in 
such a case, sufficient assets would be 
accumulated and an appropriate distribu-
tion to the requesting spouse would provide 
a share of the economic benefits earned as 
a result of the degree. la\ at 78 n. 10. 
Equitable restitution, this new animal 
not to be confused with traditional alimony 
or property, was described by the Martinez 
majority as "nothing more than an eq-
uitable sharing of the rewards of both par-
ties' common efforts and expectations." 
Id. at 78. As I stated in my dissent, the 
effect of that decision is to unnecessarily 
create a distinctly new and unprecedented 
form of marital property. Id. at 82 (Jack-
son, J., dissenting). 
The instant case is the fourth attempt in 
Utah to create "new property" in the pro-
fessional arena. My colleagues have coop-
erated by uncritically embracing a new def-
inition equating "goodwill" with "reputa-
tion," discussed below. I agree that we 
must strive for equity and fairness in di-
vorce actions, but I do not agree with the 
1. The Utah Supreme Court has granted Dr. Mar-
tinez's petition for a writ of certiorari tn rnnciH. 
means they have chosen. Under our stat-
ute, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1988), equi-
ty can be achieved through non-terminable 
alimony awards consistent with Rayburn 
and Petersen. This method is preferable to 
the judicial selection of new definitions of 
property. 
ORIGINS OF PROFESSIONAL 
GOODWILL 
Like many legal doctrines, that of profes-
sional goodwill as a marital asset divisible 
at divorce had one of its earliest airings in 
the California appellate courts. In Mueller 
v. Mueller, 144 Cal.App.2d 245, 301 P.2d 
90, 94-95 (1956), the Third District Court of 
Appeal quoted what it believed to be the 
"general rule" in 28 Am Jur. 808 that good-
will could exist in a professional practice or 
business dependent on the personal skill 
and ability of a particular person, but did 
not adopt that rule. The authority relied 
on in Mueller, however, focused on an ac-
tual sale of a professional practice. In any 
case, the Mueller court disposed of the 
case by assuming no goodwill could attach 
to such a business and then holding that 
the dental laboratory business at issue did 
not depend solely on the divorcing hus-
band's personal skill. Six years later, the 
same court said—again in dicta—that the 
value of a professional practice was proper-
ty to be considered at marriage dissolution; 
the appellant ex-wife had not even appealed 
the trial court's failure to award her any of 
the value of the respondent's law practice. 
Brawman v. Brawman, 199 CaLApp.2d 
876, 19 CaLRptr. 106, 109 (1962). Finally, 
relying on Mueller and Brawman, the Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal explicitly em-
braced the doctrine in Golden v. Golden, 
270 Cal.App.2d 401, 75 CaLRptr. 735 (1969), 
and stated the following rule: 
[I]n a divorce case, the good will of the 
husband's professional practice as a sole 
practitioner should be taken into consid-
eration in determining the award to the 
wife [I]n a matrimonial matter, the 
practice of a sole practitioner husband 
will continue, with the same intangible 
er the issue of equitable restitution. Martinez v> 
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value as it had during the marriage. Un-
der the principles of community property 
law, the wife, by virtue of her position of 
wife, made to that value the same contri-
bution as does a wife to any of the hus-
band's earnings and accumulations dur-
ing marriage. 
Id. at 405, 75 Cal.Rptr. at 737-38. The 
California cases involving professional 
goodwill after Golden did not even argue 
about whether goodwill can exist in a pro-
fessional practice. Instead, they assumed 
both that such goodwill could and did in 
fact exist, and focused on how to put a 
price tag on it E.g., In re Marriage of 
Fortier, 34 Cal.App.3d 384, 109 Cal.Rptr. 
915 (1973); In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 
Cal.App.3d 93, 113 Cal.Rptr. 58 (1974); In 
re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal.App.3d 577, 
117 Cal.Rptr. 49 (1974). As discussed more 
fully below, this shift in focus has two 
unfortunate results: (1) the use of a broad, 
new definition of "goodwill," only in the 
professional practice context, that equates 
it with personal reputation; and (2) the 
assumption that goodwill exists in every 
professional practice, relieving the request-
ing party of the burden of proving that it 
exists. 
Tracking the elevation of professional 
goodwill from dicta to law in California, 
one writer has summarized: 
Thus in just 17 years . . . California 
carried a passing quotation from a law 
encyclopedia that goodwill now could be 
sold as part of a professional practice, to 
a clear acceptance, in Fortier, that pro-
fessional goodwill was an asset accounta-
ble as property upon a hypothetical sale 
at marriage dissolution. 
Lurvey, Professional Goodwill on Mar-
riage Dissolution: Is it Property or An-
other Name for Alimony?, 52 CaliState 
Bar J. 27, 82 (1977). The result, Lurvey 
claims, is a "confusion of rules and meth-
ods for valuation, compounded by inconsist-
encies in logic and application and concep-
tual problems over possible duplication of 
2. This approach, which begs the preliminary 
question of existence, is similar to that adopted 
bv the Arizona court in Mitchell v. Mitchell 152 
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spousal support and denial of equal protec-
tion." Id. at 85. 
EXISTENCE OF 
PROFESSIONAL GOODWILL 
Judges, like valuation formulas, are 
leapfrogging over the threshold question of 
whether goodwill exists at all in a particu-
lar professional business, moving directly 
to the issue of what the value of that 
goodwill is. The court in In re Marriage 
of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 
(1984), takes a stab at existence first, valu-
ation second, but ultimately caves in and 
comingles the two issues: 
Two areas surrounding the [factors rele-
vant to valuation of goodwill, set out in 
In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal.App.3d 
93, 113 CaLRptr. 58 (1974) and adopted in 
In re Marriage of Fleege, 91 Wash.2d 
324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979),] must be clari-
fied: (1) the first step in evaluation [of 
goodwill] under the Fleege factors is the 
determination of the existence of good-
will and (2) several accounting or ap-
praisal methods may be used by the trial 
court in conjunction with the Fleege 
factors. 
The Lopez court warned that evalua-
tion of goodwill must be done with con-
siderable care and caution. In carrying 
out this warning the court instructed 
that the trial courts should first deter-
mine if goodwill exists in a particular 
practice. Not every professional busi-
ness as a going concern necessarily has 
goodwill. The Washington goodwill 
cases to date have not recognized this 
preliminary inquiry and we do so today. 
Hall, 692 P.2d at 179 (citations omitted). 
Unfortunately, the Hall court then states, 
"This preliminary inquiry takes place dur-
ing the general evaluation process. The 
trial court must bear in mind that there 
may be zero goodwill." Id. Thus, even 
after Hall, the existence of goodwill is 
going to be determined by a calculation or 
formula determining whether it has a val-
ue; if it has a value, then it exists.2 "One 
ognition of the need for a two-step determina-
tion: 
As a general rule, "the court should clearlv 
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or more [approved valuation] methods may 
be used in conjunction with the Fleege 
factors to achieve a just and fair evaluation 
of the existence and value of any profes-
sional's goodwill." Id. 692 P.2d at 180. 
The Fleege factors referred to in Hall, 692 
P.2d at 179, which are also the factors set 
forth in Lopez, are the professional's age, 
health, past demonstrated earning power, 
professional reputation in the community 
as to his judgments, skill, and knowledge3 
and his comparative professional success. 
But these are the factors outlined in Fleege 
and Lopez as relevant to the valuation of 
professional goodwill, not its existence. 
See Fleege, 588 P.2d at 1138; Lopez, 38 
Cal.App.3d at 109, 113 Cal.Rptr. at 68. 
Thus, after this bit of sleight of hand in 
Hall, Washington uses the same factors to 
determine both that professional goodwill 
exists and that it has some value. Then 
the amount of that value is determined 
with the aid of an expert who is to use one 
of the five approved formulas. According-
ly, goodwill exists when a professional has 
health, a financial track record, and reputa-
goodwill, and if so, its value, and how it 
arrived at that value." Poore v. Poore, 75 
N.CApp. 414. 331 S.E.2d 266 (1985). How-
ever, because the trial court stated that it 
utilized the gross fee approach advocated by 
appellee's own expert, and the valuation was 
reasonably supported in the record by expert 
testimony, we find no error. 
3. Fleege states that the value of professional 
goodwill can be determined based partially on 
the professional's "reputation in the community 
for judgment, skill, and knowledge." Fleege, 
588 P.2d at 1138. But the case it cites as author-
ity for the elements engendering goodwill. In re 
Estate of Giant, 57 Wash.2d 309, 356 ?2d 707, 
709 (1960), involved Pacific Iron and Metal 
Company, a business partnership, and referred 
only to "reputation for honesty and fair deal-
ing." 
4. Significantly, the primary reason Dr. Sorensen 
would have the "new goodwill" is because he 
elected to work for himself as a non-salaried 
professional rather than work for someone else 
for a salary. For example, assume a lawyer in 
solo practice who has five winnable wrongful 
death cases on hand. When he wins or settles 
those cases, the "new goodwillers" attribute 
goodwill to him because he will have excess 
earnings above what the average salaried lawyer 
makes. However, if he were to take his cases to 
another lawyer or firm, turn them over, and 
aeree to work on them for a hi«rh « lan / until 
tion. Thus, every professional who does 
not work as a salaried employee 4 automati-
cally has goodwill because every profes-
sional has all or most of these factors. 
My colleagues in this case adopt the Cali-
fornia and Washington approach and make 
the same unfortunate mistake. Their posi-
tion, boiled down, is that a non-salaried 
professional person's reputation is "good-
will" and, therefore, property. Failing to 
discern the necessity of a preliminary fac-
tual finding, based on supportive evidence 
in the record, that such professional good-
will exists, the majority opinion jumps right 
into valuation of Dr. Sorensen's dental 
practice. 
In California, the professional goodwill 
doctrine found its roots in dicta. Here, my 
colleagues think they have found identical 
roots in dicta in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). In Gardner, how-
ever, Justice Stewart was concerned that 
the parties' experts had failed to address 
the goodwill of an established business or-
successfully completed, he would not have any 
"new goodwill" as property to be divided upon 
divorce, although his high income is virtually 
the same. 
The court in Hall reached this absurd result, 
professing to see a distinction with a difference 
between salaried and non-salaried profession-
als. Dr. Judith Hall, a forty-year-old professor 
at the University of Washington, had received a 
salary increase from $32,750 to $42,000 around 
the time of the divorce. She was "widely pub-
lished and enjoyfed] a reputation as one of the 
10 top physicians in the nation in the field of 
pediatric genetics Numerous medical 
schools across the nation ha(d] offered her em-
ployment with salaries up to $60,000." Hall, 
692 P.2d at 176. The Washington Supreme 
Court held, as a matter of law, that a salaried 
employee such as Judith Hall cannot have good-
will. Id. at 178. But see L. Weitzman, The 
Divorce Revolution 122 (1985) (suggesting the 
California courts and others have already laid 
the necessary foundation for finding "goodwill" 
in salaried employees too). The Hall court ap-
parently reached this conclusion because "only 
the practicing professional has a business or 
practice to which the goodwill can attach." 
Hall, 692 P.2d at 178. Was not Judith Hall a 
practicing professional? Did she not, like her 
physician husband who worked for a profes-
sional corporation, also have health, reputation 
for skill and knowledge, and comparative pro-
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ganization, the Ogden Clinic, not the per-
sonal reputation of Mr. Gardner 
The Ogden Clinic, of which Mr. Gard-
ner is a member, is a well-entrenched 
institution, whose twenty-three members 
have banded together in a business orga-
nization. It is not likely to be highly 
susceptible to earnings interruptions be-
cause of the ill health of one of its mem-
bers. The Ogden Clinic is not entirely 
valueless.... Mrs. Gardner's account-
ants value the business much higher 
[than Mr. Gardner does]. Neither gave 
consideration to the good will inherent in 
the professional clinic 
Id. at 1080 (footnote omitted). The foot-
note to this text also clearly refers to good-
will as an asset of a business, not of a 
person. 4The ability of a business to gen-
erate income from its continued patronage 
is commonly referred to as good will." Id. 
at 1080 n. 1. 
The twenty-three member Ogden Clinic 
is the perfect contrast to Dr. Sorensen's 
one-man dental practice, which is highly 
susceptible to earnings interruptions from 
many causes. Moreover, when well, he can 
work only so many hours a day and that is 
the end of his production. His opportuni-
ties to increase earnings are negligible. 
As the court in Gardner seems to recog-
nize, traditional nonlegal definitions of 
goodwill focus on it as the asset of a busi-
ness, not of an individual. The goodwill 
concept used by accountants focuses on its 
measurement through a deductive process, 
not on its nature. Parkman, The Treat-
ment of Professional Goodurill in Divorce 
Proceedings, 18 Fam.L.Q. 213 (1984). 
Thus, their criteria for goodwill are aimed 
at something that can be measured, such 
as excess earning power or payments made 
in excess of an established value of a re-
source. Id. To economists, the value of an 
5. Professor Allen Parkman, an economist and 
lawyer who teaches at the University of New 
Mexico's Anderson School of Management, at-
tributes the confusion in the case law to the lack 
of any focus on a clear definition of goodwill, 
which the majority opinion in this case shares. 
The courts can obviously define terms in a 
manner that differs from their meaning in 
accounting and economics. However, if they 
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asset depends on the future profits it can 
produce. Thus, the economic concept of 
goodwill focuses on the fact that an estab-
lished business can make greater profits 
than new businesses because of its internal 
and external relationships; once the reve-
nue produced by these relationships is capi-
talized, it can be viewed as an asset of the 
business, i.e., goodwill. Id. at 214. 
In contrast, the legal concept of goodwill 
focuses on the idea that it is an asset 
which generates excess earnings. Be-
cause the legal concept has not been 
fitted into the existing accounting and 
economic framework, however, experts 
have had a difficult time applying the 
concept In particular, the legal concept 
does not clearly differentiate between ex-
cess returns to individuals and excess 
returns to businesses. This confusion is 
especially noticeable in the case of pro-
fessional practices. 
In both the accounting and economic 
literature, goodwill is an asset of a busi-
ness based on earnings in excess of nor-
mal profits. It is based on the intangi-
ble, but generally marketable, existence 
in a business of established relations 
with employees, customers, and suppli-
ers. The same analysis would not view 
goodwill as being reflected in an individ-
ual. If excess profits of a business are 
attributable to an individual, that individ-
ual should be able to capture that value 
in higher wages. It would be appropri-
ate to view personal attributes as "repu-
tation" rather than as "goodwill." By 
using reputation and goodwill inter-
changeably, the courts have created a 
confused situation in the evaluation of 
professional businesses. 
Id. at 215.5 
In a professional practice, goodwill can 
exist in the business, but not in the individ-
then turn to these fields for an evaluation, 
they have to realize the confusion that is go-
ing to be created. If the courts say that there 
is goodwill in a sole practice, when there is 
none from an accounting or economic per-
spective, a problem of evaluation is created. 
It is like saying that an apple is an orange and 
then, even in the face of protests from an 
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ual practicing the profession. A large pro-
fessional business organization can have 
substantial goodwill. The Ogden Clinic fits 
the example of such an organization given 
by Parkman. See id. at 216. It does not 
have any one professional's name directly 
associated with it; patients come not be-
cause of any particular individual profes-
sional, but because of their own needs and 
the clinic's past delivery of high quality 
service. If that clinic sold for a price 
greater than the value of its tangible as-
sets, the value of that excess, goodwill, 
would not be based on the presence at the 
clinic of any particular employee or profes-
sional. 
Dr. Sorensen's solo dental practice fits 
Parkman's example, at the other extreme, 
of the limited opportunities for goodwill in 
a small professional practice, even one that 
is smoothly operated. See id. His patients 
come because of high quality service. He 
has a few employees, but equally qualified 
people are readily available. Patients 
would not necessarily return to his office 
location just because they had gone to a 
doctor there before. A new doctor would 
not pay for his practice much in excess of 
the value of his tangible assets and ac-
counts receivable. 
By distorting the original definition of 
business goodwill to equate it with such 
subjective factors as personal reputation in 
the professional practice context, the ma-
jority's decision, like the cases it relies on, 
fabricates the existence of goodwill as as 
asset belonging to every non-salaried pro-
fessional, whether in a solo practice, part-
nership, or professional corporation. I be-
lieve an objective threshold standard for 
determining the existence of goodwill must 
be enunciated. 
agricultural expert, asking for an analysis of 
the apple's citrus content. 
Parkman, The Treatment of Professional Good-
will in Divorce Proceedings, 18 Fam.L.Q. 213, 
216 (1984). 
6. Even this "past sales" method of valuing pro-
fessional goodwill has been criticized as subject 
to manipulation and not necessarily accurate, 
ANALYSIS OF VALUATION METHODS 
AND FORMULAS APPLIED TO 
"NEW" GOODWILL 
The majority asserts that the valuation 
procedure employed by Dr. Austin, Mrs. 
Sorensen's expert, is one commonly used 
by his brokerage firm and is also consistent 
with methodologies recognized and ap-
proved in other jurisdictions. But they are 
not sure about the method he employed: 
"Although not specifically stated by either 
party, Dr. Austin appeared to use in part a 
market value methodology to value Dr. 
Sorensen's dental practice. A market val-
ue approach has been cited with approval in 
other jurisdictions, see, e.g., In re Marriage 
of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175,180 
(1984)...." Footnote 25,supra. Actually, 
Dr. Austin used his own gross revenue 
capitalization formula and merely labeled 
his method a "market value" approach. 
Gross revenue formulas automatically at-
tribute goodwill to every professional be-
cause every professional has revenue. 
In Hall, the Washington Supreme Court 
approved five professional goodwill valua-
tion methods, including three capitalization 
formulas based on capitalization of net 
profits, not of gross revenue. In this case, 
Austin did not use the market value meth-
od, described by the court in Hall as fol-
lows: 
The fourth method, the market value 
approach, sets a value on professional 
goodwill by establishing what fair price 
would be obtained in the current open 
market if the practice were to be sold. 
This method necessitates that a profes-
sional practice has been recently sold, 
is in the process of being sold or is the 
subject of a recent offer to purchase. 
HalU 692 P.2d at 180 (emphasis added).* 
Thus, although Hall approves only a 
market value approach based on a current 
Property § 23.05[2J(a) at 23-66 (J. McCahey ed. 
1988), prompting some courts to insist on the 
use of accounting formulas that capitalize ex-
cess earnings. These, however, have their own 
faults, including the problem of estimating a 
consistent "normal" return on tangible assets by 
which to measure "excess" earnings and the 
broad leeway given to the appraiser to choose a 
capitalization rate. Id. § 29.05[3][c] at 29-44, 
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sale of the particular practice at issue, Aus-
tin used a past sales approach that only 
involved six sales of other practices, sales 
generated by his appraisal firm at prices 
created by its methods. The number of 
sales (two each year for three years) is too 
few to establish any market and none were 
in the vicinity of Roy, Utah or Weber Coun-
ty, Utah. They are too remote in both time 
and place to be reliable indicators of the 
value of any goodwill in Dr. Sorensen's 
practice. 
Unlike the majority, I believe courts 
should not be hoodwinked into accepting 
the valuation testimony offered by one par-
ty or the other, just because one sounds 
more credible than the other. If both ex-
perts are out in left field, the court should 
ignore them or require counsel to provide 
the proper data and analysis. 
FAILURE TO DETERMINE WHETHER 
THE PROFESSIONAL'S CAREER 
ASSET WAS ACQUIRED BEFORE 
MARRIAGE 
Even if there was evidence in this case 
on which to base a finding that goodwill 
exists in Dr\, Sorensen's dental practice, 
and even if there was credible evidence to 
support the value of that goodwill, there is 
It is important to note that there is a great 
deal of diverse opinion as to whether earnings 
from a professional practice should be capi-
talized at all and if so, what rate is applicable. 
Critics of the use of capitalization point out 
that a generally accepted accounting and ap-
praisal principle is that earnings are to be 
capitalized only where it can be assumed they 
will continue in the future. In the context of 
a professional practice, therefore, a court em-
ploying the formula approach is, either direct-
ly or implicitly, placing a value on future 
earnings and results. Yet, courts are, often 
without adequate explanation, quick to point 
out that they are not so doing. 
la\ § 29.05{3][cl at 2*-46 (footnote omitted). 
Often* the professional ends up paying for the 
new goodwill with future earnings. 
[Another] difficulty with these accounting for-
mulas [for valuing professional goodwill] is 
that the result may be inappropriately high 
since factors other than goodwill may contrib-
ute to the excess income. For instance, if a 
physician works 60 to 70 hours a week in-
stead of the usual 40 to 50, the excess earnings 
generated by this additional effort may be 
attributed to goodwill. 
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one remaining flaw in the property distri-
bution in this case. The trial court never 
examined—and none of the evidence ad-
dresses—whether the intangible asset of 
professional goodwill was acquired before 
or after the marriage vows. 
Here, the trial court did recognize a tim-
ing problem with the expert's valuation 
methods. Mrs. Sorensen's expert did not 
pay attention to the time when Dr. Soren-
sen acquired his reputation or "goodwill." 
The court found that "[t]he only reasonable 
way to value said practice is to proportion 
it based upon the years the parties have 
been married during practice." 7 There is 
no evidence to support that finding. To 
the contrary, there is evidence that virtual-
ly all, if not all, of the value of the practice, 
including goodwill or reputation, was Dr. 
Sorensen's pre-marital asset. Dr. Soren-
sen's evidence showed that, when adjusted 
for inflation, net earnings from his profes-
sional services were essentially the same at 
the time of marriage as at the time of 
divorcee The number of his clients had 
decreased. Thus, there was no increase in 
the value of his goodwill or reputation dur-
ing the marriage. Whatever it was and 
whatever its value, it was Dr. Sorensen's 
Comment, Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing 
Professional Goodwill as Community Property at 
Dissolution of the Marital Community, 56 Tul.L. 
Rev. 313. 333-34 (1981) (footnote omitted). 
7. A question not yet brought before the 
courts is the issue of the existence of pre-mari-
tal goodwill when the practitioner spouse has 
married well after the commencement of his 
practice. This could become quite significant. 
For example, a professional who had been in 
practice for twenty or more years could mar-
ry and then dissolve the marriage a short time 
later. Presumably the value of the goodwill 
accrued as of the date of the marriage would 
be separate property and would form a sort of 
basis. Only the goodwill accrued during the 
marriage would be community property. Its 
value could be determined by calculating the 
difference between the value of goodwill as of 
the date of dissolution and the value as of the 
date of marriage. Since goodwill is not ac-
crued at a constant rate, as are pension bene-
fits, the application of a simple time-based 
percentage formula to the value on the date of 
dissolution would not suffice. 
Comment, supra note 6, at 340 (footnote omit-
ted) (emphasis added). 
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pre-marital asset, not a marital asset8 
Since Dr. Sorensen owned his career as-
set, his practice, and its "goodwill" prior to 
marriage, that asset should be treated as 
his separate property, to be awarded to him 
at dissolution in the absence of exigent 
circumstances faced by the trial court in 
fashioning equitable awards of property, 
support, and alimony, circumstances not 
present here. See Preston v. Preston, 646 
P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1982); see also Morten-
sen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 310 (Utah 
1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, 1 dissent from my col-
leagues' creation of yet another species of 
new property through their broad redefini-
tion of goodwill in the professional practice 
context, and from their erroneous approval 
of valuation factors and an unacceptable 
valuation method as a substitute for evi-
dence of the existence of goodwill, however 
defined. Traditional alimony awards, plus 
nonmodifiable rehabilitative or reimburse-
ment alimony awards, where appropriate, 
offer the best methods for achieving equity 
and fairness in Utah. 
Even if I agreed with the majority's 
analysis and disposition of the professional 
goodwill issue, I would nonetheless vacate 
the trial court's award of part of the value 
8. Another method of analysis, recently set forth 
by Professor Parkman in a thought-provoking 
law review article, better demonstrates that Dr. 
Sorensen's income-producing ability was his, 
not theirs. See Parkman, The Recognition of 
Human Capital as Property in Divorce Settle-
ments, 40 Ark.L.Rev. 439, 440-49 (1987). Dr. 
Sorensen (or someone other than Mrs. Soren-
sen) made all the essential investments in the 
skill and knowledge he has that permits him to 
generate income in excess of the income he 
could derive from his innate strength and intel-
ligence. His investments in himself, which in-
creased the expected future income stream that 
would flow to him, were completed at least six 
years prior to his marriage. Usually, 
the greatest impediment to attaining access to 
a professional education is probably not the 
direct costs of the education, but the difficulty 
of obtaining admission. The ability to gain 
admission is the result of earlier human capi-
tal investments. After admission, the most 
substantial cost of graduate education is 
usually the income sacrificed by the student. 
to Mrs. Sorensen because there is no evi-
dence to justify not returning it to Dr. 
Sorensen as his pre-marital asset 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Thomas Eugene DAVIS, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 870221-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Feb. 21, 1989. 
Forgery arrestee sought return of 
money seized from his person pursuant to 
statute requiring prosecutor to return 
property which is not needed as evidence 
upon proof of ownership and lawfulness of 
possession. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., re-
fused order to return, and forgery arrestee 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., 
held that: (1) State worked de facto forfei-
ture by retaining money for more than two 
Id at 444-45. The current value of this income 
stream, his human capital, is a personal asset. 
See id at 440, 447. That asset has value precise-
ly because it will produce a stream of future 
returns. Id at 439-40 & n. 4. Even in a closer 
case, where a professional married while still a 
medical student, Parkman advocates treatment 
of an investment in one's self as non-marital 
property: 
For a medical doctor, the major increase in 
his future anticipated income stream occurs 
when he enters medical school, because the 
probability is very high that he will finish. 
. . . [T]he critical investments had already oc-
curred when the student entered medical 
school 
Under normal circumstances, the invest-
ment in human capital prior to marriage will 
be so large and essential relative to the invest-
ment after marriage that an individual's hu-
man capital should be treated as separate 
property. 
Id at 448. 
